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ABSTRACT 
 This research applies social network analysis and social identity theory to threat 
assessment investigations of subjects who commit acts of targeted violence. It provides a 
framework for understanding the expanding threat of targeted violence and its impact on 
U.S. homeland security. Statistics on targeted violence in the United States show that 
incidents are increasing in both frequency and lethality. Traditional studies of targeted 
violence have focused heavily on the mental state of the “lone” perpetrator without fully 
examining the role of social influences. This research incorporates case studies intended 
to offer insight, increase understanding, and suggest new methods of enhancing the 
current field of threat assessment for targeted violence cases. The findings of this 
research recommend new strategies for conducting targeted violence threat assessment 
investigations utilizing the application of social network analysis and social identity 
theory. Through an examination of previous targeted violent actors, this research 
establishes that understanding relevant social conditions can contribute significant clues 
about an individual’s risk of entering a pathway to violence. These clues can be mapped 
and followed over a period of time to reveal a social withdrawal and loss of restraining 
relationships. 
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The ability to predict when an individual is going to commit an act of violence 
before the act is carried out is possibly the most difficult and challenging mission in law 
enforcement. For an investigator, it is the equivalent of playing a psychological chess 
game, in which the players can only see a fraction of their opponents’ pieces, who look for 
obscure clues in answers from subjects who are often intentionally deceptive. Further 
adding to the difficulty is the fact that no existing profile or model is available for subjects 
who eventually commit acts of targeted violence, so investigators are left to search for signs 
that an individual of interest has the potential to evolve into violent behavior. Making 
matters worse, most potential offenders of targeted violence evolve; in other words, they 
can initially be judged, correctly, not to be a threat, but within a short period of time, they 
can change, plan, and execute an attack. 
Statistics on targeted violence in the United States show that incidents are 
increasing in both frequency and lethality. Targeted violence is described as an “incident 
of violence where an attacker selects a particular target prior to an attack.”1 The highest 
profile attacks within the United States since September 11, 2001, have been targeted 
violence attacks committed by one or two offenders. These lone offender attacks have 
given rise to the classification as lone wolf or self-radicalized offenders. An analysis of 
lone wolf attackers by decade shows that more attacks have occurred in the past eight years 
than in the 50 years between 1950 and 2000. Additionally, the lone wolf attacks from 1950 
to 2009 resulted in 27 fewer fatalities than in the past eight years combined.2 
This research has compiled profiles on two known perpetrators of targeted violence 
to determine whether the use of social network analysis (SNA) can provide data, or 
substantial evidence, that will correctly lead an investigator to explore a suspect as a 
                                               
1 Lina Alathari, Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School 
Violence (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, 2019), 1, 
https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf. 
2 Katie Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common―And More Deadly,” Frontline, 
July 14, 2016, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-
and-more-deadly/. 
xvi 
possible threat. Research for this thesis has utilized both information taken from the 
secondary research of case studies of previous actors of targeted violence, and from the 
profiles assembled after extensive research on these actors, to determine whether SNA can 
be used to enhance the success rate of threat assessment investigations. The subjects used 
in the case studies were determined by the amount of relevant open-source information 
available. First, the subjects were analyzed under a current threat assessment. Next, the 
subjects were classified under a dimensional system, and vulnerabilities that could help 
investigators were discussed. The research of these two methods attempts to provide a 
possible new way to compare categories of lone actors across different crimes. Finally, the 
test cases were reviewed to determine if a social network component could assist an 
investigator in determining the meaning behind potentially significant behaviors through 
an analysis of a suspect’s social ties.  
The importance of using social network analytics in this method is the attempt to 
collect and analyze social influences on the actions of targeted violence actors, which are 
currently underrepresented in threat assessment models. When examined through the lens 
of SIT, it is understood that social ties can inspire individuals to perform tremendous acts 
of violence, as with terrorist organizations, but can also impose constraints on individuals’ 
behavior.3 The more important social ties individuals possess, the more their behavior will 
be constrained or modified to the groups that have captured their loyalty. The fewer in-
groups individuals align themselves with, the fewer constraints inhibit or modify their 
behavior and choices. SNA is a way to reflect these ties, to understand better whether 
people’s ties are influencing a pathway to violence. To be successful, threat assessment 
investigations seek to understand as much as possible about the subjects. In effect, SNA 
creates the roadmap of the subjects’ influential relationships, and social identity theory 
(SIT) provides the key to unlock the meaning. 
The two case studies conducted during this research found striking similarities 
between the backgrounds of Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik. During their 
                                               
3 Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 100–127. 
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childhood development, both individuals lived in homes with troubled marriages, which 
eventually led to one parent leaving the family. McVeigh’s mother left home when he was 
10 years old and Breivik’s parents separated before he was two years old.4 Breivik had 
minimal contact with his father and would last see him at the age of 15.5 Neither subject 
did well in school, nor did they have any real success in any aspect of their lives during 
this period. Neither subject had any significant criminal activity prior to the planning and 
implementing of their attacks. Both subjects did have some success after leaving school. 
McVeigh was a decorated soldier in the U.S. Army, who was promoted to the position of 
Sergeant, and Breivik operated a business that sold fake diplomas, which was financially 
successful for a period before eventually going bankrupt.6 
Both subjects suffered failures with the most significant groups in their lives, 
McVeigh when he failed Army Special Forces Selection School and Breivik when he failed 
to obtain a position with the Progressive Party.7 After these failures, while both saw a 
significant decrease in their social networks, they were not isolated and still maintained a 
social network. However, both of their network ties from that point were heavily weighted 
towards those who shared the same extremist views, and neither was a member of a group 
that would have constrained their violent behavior. Both subjects were motivated by long-
standing grievances against the government that evolved over an extended period of time. 
Many of the contacts that both had after leaving the groups that were important to their 
identities would have pushed them on a continued path of violence rather than constraining 
violent ideas.  
Both subjects gravitated to others who shared similar extremist views, but 
eventually determined that they were the one who needed to lead the way with actions 
                                               
4 Asne Seierstad, One of Us: The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in Norway (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 1–12; Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist, 1st ed. (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2001), 7–36. 
5 Seierstad, 202. 
6 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist, 49–81; Seierstad, 107–120. 
7 Michel and Herbeck, 81–95. 
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because the others were incapable.8 They were similar in their grandiose ideas of self-
importance, which did not coincide with the lens of failure through which the rest of society 
viewed them.9 Both spent considerable time planning and coordinating their attacks, and 
both used extensive operational security methods to conceal acquiring the explosives 
needed for the attacks. Both subjects used similar bombing attacks, although Breivik was 
clearly influenced by McVeigh’s attack, and expanded his own attack in a much more 
personal way than McVeigh. In this regard, he was likely attempting to eclipse McVeigh 
for the shocking nature of the attack, and thereby bring more attention to himself.10  
In a comparison of mental health issues, the subjects have some notable differences, 
but their similarities are likely more significant. McVeigh had some suicidal thoughts prior 
to his attack, but was not diagnosed with a mental health issue.11 Breivik, on the other 
hand, did not have suicidal thoughts, and was evaluated twice following his attack. In the 
first evaluation, they found that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, which made him 
criminally innocent, but in the second opinion, which the court sided with, Breivik was 
found to have pathological self-aggrandizement, and was found criminally responsible.12 
Whatever their medical diagnoses, both men had the capacity to plan, organize, and carry 
out an attack, and neither was hindered in that regard by any mental incapacity. If anything, 
possible feelings of paranoia may have caused them to add layers of operational security 
into their plans, and thereby make them harder to detect.  
Specialized units need to be created within law enforcement to better understand 
threat assessment investigations, and gain experience conducting them. Threat assessment 
investigations are more closely tied to intelligence gathering investigations than to normal 
investigations, with an end result of formal criminal charges. In addition to utilizing normal 
investigative techniques, a threat assessment investigator needs to understand both mental 
                                               
8 Michel and Herbeck, 117–205. 
9 Seierstad, One of Us. 
10 Seierstad. 
11 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist, 95–117. 
12 Ingrid Melle, “The Breivik Case and What Psychiatrists Can Learn from It,” World Psychiatry 12, 
no. 1 (February 2013): 17–18. 
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health issues and grievances in people who may be attempting to hide their true intentions. 
Threat assessment investigations involve gaining as much possible information about a 
person to determine if this person will at some point, maybe years down the line, commit 
an act of violence. In addition to the threat assessment model provided by the assassination 
case study, additions should include the added help of metal health providers working in 
conjunction with investigators, as well as computerized mapping of the subject’s social 
networks.  
The United Kingdom model for combining mental health professionals and law 
enforcement shows great promise in attempting to understand fully all aspects of a subject 
under assessment. This model should be studied for use in this country. Threat assessment 
groups should include representatives from all relevant law enforcement agencies sharing 
information. The more information gathered results in a clearer picture, which will result 
in a better understanding and analysis. These threat assessment groups should investigate 
all types of targeted violence including lone wolves and school shooters. For school threat 
assessment subjects, officials in the educational system should be included and consulted 
by the assessment groups. Computer case models, which alert the investigator if the subject 
under threat assessment does something that requires immediate attention, such as the 
purchase of a gun or explosives, should also be utilized. This SNA would have the benefit 
of providing an investigator with the best contacts to interview to gain insight into the 
subject’s mental state and possible motivations and grievances. Understanding the people 
closest to the subject is also important because one of the statistics found across various 
studies shows that a high percentage of targeted violence offenders communicate their 
intentions to commit violence to people close to them. An SNA can also provide 
investigators with a picture to identify changes over time, which is important since many 
targeted violence actors take years from the time they develop the grievance until they 
move to an actual pathway of violence. 
SNA has the potential for great success within the field of threat assessment. As the 
case studies in this research show, the SNA model provides an investigator with a simple 
visual map of the important people and groups within a subject’s network. These important 
ties are vital to understanding those who influence and constrain the subject’s actions. At 
xx 
the core of any inquiry, the more information that investigators have, the more accurate 
they will be with the direction of the investigation itself. This mapping converts raw 
information into a digestible and more easily understandable format. This tool cannot only 
show the size of the subjects’ network, it can be used as snapshots of time to show if 
subjects are withdrawing from their networks. SNA should be used in conjunction with 
SIT to understand how the network data collected by SNA will act as pathway or constraint 
on the subject of the analysis.  
As a tool, SNA would also make the transfer of cases potentially easier. As 
mentioned, many subjects have taken years to move from their original grievances to their 
pathway to violence, during which time it is possible that the original investigator would 
no longer be assigned to the case. A social network map from the original investigation 
would be extremely helpful in identifying the current influential people in the subject’s 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The ability to predict when an individual is going to commit an act of violence 
before the act is carried out is possibly the most difficult and challenging mission in law 
enforcement. For an investigator, it is the equivalent of playing a psychological chess 
game, in which the players can only see a fraction of their opponent’s pieces, and then 
looks for obscure clues in answers from subjects who are often intentionally deceptive. 
Further adding to the difficulty is the fact that no existing profile or model for subjects who 
eventually commit acts of targeted violence exists, so investigators are left to search for 
signs that an individual of interest has the potential to evolve into violent behavior. Making 
matters worse, most potential offenders of targeted violence evolve; in other words, they 
can initially be judged, correctly, not to be a threat, but within a short period of time, they 
can change, plan, and execute an attack. For example, if Timothy McVeigh had been 
interviewed before August 1992, he might have expressed some anti-government 
sentiments but likely would not have been deemed a threat. After Ruby Ridge in August 
1992, his anti-government sentiments would have been stronger, but he likely still would 
not have shown enough perceptible indications to classify him as an imminent threat. In 
February 1993, McVeigh drove from Florida to Texas, and attempted to pass through a 
checkpoint entrance to the Branch Davidian compound; at this point, he had begun to act 
on his grievances, which potentially could have led a threat investigator to refer the case 
for continued monitoring.1 Finally, following the passing of the assault weapons ban in 
September 1994, McVeigh fully entered the planning phase of his eventual attack by 
purchasing a storage unit in Arizona, and obtaining explosives through purchase and theft.2 
It is only during this period of September 1994 when he began obtaining explosives, until 
April 19, 1995, when he detonated a truck bomb in front of the federal building in 
                                               
1 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 
2001), 117–125. 
2 Michel and Herbeck, 159–205. 
2 
Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, that if investigated successfully, he would have been 
deemed a threat and action could have be enacted. 
Some individuals who commit acts of targeted violence never come to the attention 
of law enforcement prior to their violent acts, and others who do come into contact with 
law enforcement, are judged not to be a danger. The resulting damage from failing to 
identify these individuals before they commit acts of violence has been devastating. On 
October 1, 2017, Stephen Paddock opened fire from a hotel room on a crowd attending an 
outdoor concert in Las Vegas Nevada.3 In 10 minutes, 58 lives were lost and 851 people 
were injured before the gunman took his own life.4 This event was the deadliest mass 
shooting in U.S. history, and eclipsed the previous mark of 49, set less than a year before 
at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Before he opened fire in Las Vegas, Paddock 
was completely unknown to law enforcement as a potential threat.5 Less than five months 
after Paddock’s attack, a former student walked into a Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
School in Parkland Florida, and in six minutes, 34 students, and teachers were shot, and 17 
lost their lives.6 Conversely, to the Paddock situation, the shooter at Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School, Nikolas Cruz had multiple encounters with the police, and had been 
reported as a threat to commit a school shooting.7 For law enforcement, the challenge ahead 
is to find a way to identify the next Paddock before he attacks, and to find better methods 
in dealing with the next Cruz. 
Statistics on targeted violence in the United States show that incidents are 
increasing in both frequency and lethality. Targeted violence is described as an “incident 
                                               
3 Trever Alsup, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Preliminary Investigative Report 1 
October/Mass Casualty Shooting (Las Vegas: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 2018), 3, 
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/1_October_FIT_Report_01-18-2018_Footnoted.pdf. 
4 Alsup, 3. 
5 Alsup, 3. 
6 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, Initial Report Submitted to the 
Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Senate President (Tallahassee, FL: Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, 2019), 7, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf. 
7 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, 231–262. 
3 
of violence where an attacker selects a particular target prior to an attack.”8 The largest 
number of profile attacks within the United States since September 11, 2001, have been 
targeted violence attacks committed by one or two offenders. These lone offender attacks 
have given rise to the classification as lone wolf or self-radicalized offenders. An analysis 
of lone wolf attackers by decade shows that more attacks have occurred in the past eight 
years than in the 50 years between 1950 and 2000. Additionally, the lone wolf attacks from 
1950 to 2009 resulted in 27 fewer fatalities than in the past eight years combined.9 Prior to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, no U.S. military member was targeted in the 
United States; however, since that date, 47 military members have been killed or 
wounded.10 Additionally, from 1950 to September 11, 2001, 12 law enforcement officers 
have been wounded or killed. Moreover, 24 law enforcement officers have been wounded 
or killed by lone wolves in the 16 years since that time.11 
In 2010, then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Panetta described lone 
wolf attacks as the “main threat to this country.”12 A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
report has described lone wolves as the most significant domestic terrorism threat facing 
the United States.13 This threat may be manifesting into public perception as a lack of 
governmental control due to the past targets of targeted violence actors that include 
churches, schools, outdoor concerts, nightclubs, and office buildings. These locations are 
often places Americans frequent on a daily basis, which makes the threat of becoming a 
victim much more personal.  
                                               
8 Lina Alathari, Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School 
Violence (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, 2019), 1, 
https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf. 
9 Katie Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common―And More Deadly,” Frontline, 
July 14, 2016, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-
and-more-deadly/. 
10 Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of 
Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies, 1940–2013 (Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2017), 5, https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36107.v1. 
11 Hamm and Spaaij, 5. 
12 Randy Borum, Robert Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, “A Dimensional Approach to Analyzing Lone 
Offender Terrorism,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 17, no. 5 (September 2012): 389–96. 
13 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40. 
4 
Based on statistics, the number of successful lone wolf attacks is increasing in the 
United States, which can potentially erode public confidence in law enforcement’s ability 
to protect and prevent further incidents, especially when they occur at schools.14 The 
shooter at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School exhibited every sign that he was a 
threat and in need of both evaluation and threat management. The local Sheriff’s 
Department contacted him at his home 20 times, and he came to the attention of school 
administrators and mental health workers, state social workers, and the FBI.15 An 
investigator from the Florida Department of Children and Families wrote about the 
suspect’s plans to buy a gun, was concerned about his clinical depression, and expressions 
of hate including the use of Nazi symbols, and still rated his level of risk as low.16 The FBI 
was contacted by a concerned neighbor who felt as though the suspect was about to “shoot 
up a school” one month before the attack, and yet the case was not referred for investigation 
by the call center.17 Following the attack, the FBI Deputy Director stated that the “Number 
1 risk for our organization is losing the faith of the American people.”18 This case 
highlights the devastating consequences that any missteps can have, and also shows the 
tremendous effort required to sort through large volumes of information. The FBI stated 
that it received more than 765,000 phone tips last year, and another 750,000 internet threat 
tips, with nine out of 10 of the tips proving to be unsubstantiated.19 Following the shooting 
                                               
14 Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More Deadly.” 
15 Brett Murphy, “Numerous Missed Opportunities before Florida Shooter Killed 17 at Broward High 





18 Chris Strohm, “FBI Vows to Regain Trust after Missing Warning on Florida Shooter,” Bloomberg, 




in Parkland, reports of homeschooling rates dramatically increased as parents became 
increasingly fearful of sending their children to schools.20 
The Orlando shooting involved a radicalized individual who in 2016 went into a 
nightclub and killed 49 people, which at the time was the worst mass shooting in U.S. 
history.21 In this case, the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office had referred the attacker to the 
FBI after co-workers warned that he claimed connections to Al Qaeda and Hezbollah and 
wished to die a martyr.22 The FBI began a 10-month investigation during which it 
interviewed the suspect three times and added the suspect to the Terrorism Watch list.23 
Eventually, they determined that he was not a threat and closed the investigation; two years 
later, he pledged his allegiance to ISIS and carried out his attack.24 Conversely, the Las 
Vegas shooter was an individual who had no contact with law enforcement or mental health 
services and posed very little chance of discovery prior to his attack. These two cases show 
the complexity and diversity of the individuals who commit these types of attacks and 
highlight the need to develop solutions not currently being utilized. 
The upward trend regarding the statistics of lone-offender incidents of targeted 
violence show no sign of declining. In many of these instances, the current law enforcement 
methods have not been successful in preventing their occurrences. The majority of the 
recent high-profile targeted violence instanced in the United States has involved subjects 
who did not commit a criminal act before the attack or committed a minor violation that 
resulted in little to no jail time. Additionally, the majority of these individuals did not suffer 
from mental illness and would not have been eligible as a referral to a psychological 
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evaluation. Most importantly, an arrest also does not address the issue of an individual 
evolving into a targeted violence threat, but merely addresses the issue of that small 
transgression that leads to the arrest in the first place. Further complicating the issue for 
law enforcement following a major targeted violence event is public pressure to simplify 
the act as the workings of a mentally unstable or radicalized mind, when in fact, the true 
motivation is a complex mixture of drives derived from personal, political, and social 
experiences that combine to manifest a deeply held grievance.25 
Early identification strategies to increase the likelihood of preventing targeted 
violence are needed to combat the rising threat. New methods, such as the United Kingdom 
Fixated Threat and Channel programs, should be analyzed for possible modeling in the 
United States, and computer programs that assist investigators, such as social network 
analysis (SNA), are needed to detect information previously unrecorded and analyze the 
information with tools not previously employed. Computer monitoring of those judged a 
possible threat that alerts investigators when a gun or explosives are purchased should also 
be researched and tested. Further research should be conducted on the current threat 
assessment models, which may be focusing too heavily on mental health data and not 
enough on social influences, such as the lack of group membership, which may act as a 
restraint against committing violence.  
Anders Breivik, a lone offender of a targeted violence attack that killed 62 people 
in Norway in 2011, may have best summed up the depth of the current threat when he 
stated:  
One of the great strengths of our enemies, the Western European cultural 
Marxist/multiculturalist regimes is their vast resources and their advanced 
investigation/forensic capabilities. There are thousands of video cameras all 
over European major cities and you will always risk leaving behind DNA, 
finger prints, witnesses or other evidence that will eventually lead to your 
arrest. They can also back trace your internet traffic in most cases and use 
infiltrators or informers. They are overwhelmingly superior in almost every 
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aspect. But every 7 headed monster has an Achilles heel. This Achilles heel 
is their vulnerability against single/duo martyr cells.26 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. How can investigators better understand, explain, and possibly anticipate 
actions related to targeted violence actors?  
2. Is SNA an effective tool to understand the behaviors of targeted violence 
actors better? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to analyze threat assessment research, and 
the use of new methods that can assist investigators based on researched models of targeted 
violence actors. The material is derived from government reports, academia, and 
professional journals.  
1. Threat Assessment Analysis  
The current models used in threat assessment began in the 1990s with the work of 
Fein and Vossekuil in Preventing Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional Case Study 
Project. This case study examined 83 persons who had attempted or succeeded in 
assassinating public officials in the United States between 1949 and 1997.27 The 
researchers sought insight into how the subjects developed the idea for the attack, the 
factors that motivated the attack, the advancement from idea to action, target selection, 
planning strategies, and role of mental illness. The key findings of the study were that 
attackers do not fit any single demographic or psychological profile.28 Additionally, mental 
illness does not usually play a critical role, and persons who actually pose threats rarely 
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make explicit threats to law enforcement or their intended targets.29 These findings led the 
authors to conclude, “that targeted violence is the result of an understandable process of 
thinking and behavior.”30 In other words, rational actors, who were not impulsive, and 
formulated the idea to act after a significant amount of time and planning, committed the 
majority of attacks.31 For some of the case study subjects, the planning phase of the attack 
monopolized their thoughts and provided “a sense of purpose” that dulled their emotional 
pain.32 This work is the foundation upon which all other work in the field of threat 
assessment has been built. 
Vossekuil and Fein further developed the field of threat assessment with an article 
that expanded on their previous findings, and in 2000, they published a guide that provides 
information on how to conduct threat assessment investigations: Protective Intelligence 
and Threat Assessment Investigations.33 This guide for law enforcement officials’ details 
methods of conducting threat investigations and also includes guidance on how to develop 
a threat management program. 
In 2002, Vossekuil and Fein worked with Reddy, Borum, and Modzeleski for a case 
study on targeted violence in schools.34 Following the attack at Columbine High School, 
this study used data from the 1997 case study to understand better why school shootings 
happen and what can be done to prevent them. The study identified 37 incidents, working 
backward from 2000 to the first targeted school incident in 1974.35 The results of this study 
corroborated those of the previous one, including the finding that no useful profile of 
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students who commit acts of targeted violence at schools exists.36 It was determined in 
both studies that only one-third of those who had committed acts of targeted violence 
received any kind of mental health evaluation, and less than one-fifth were diagnosed with 
a mental illness prior to the incident.37 The studies also found that acts of targeted school 
violence are rarely sudden or impulsive; attacking students often conveyed their intentions 
to others, but rarely to intended targets. Most students who committed acts of targeted 
violence struggled with personal loss or failures, and many contemplated suicide, felt 
bullied or persecuted, and engaged in activities that inspired concern in others or indicated 
a need for help.38 
In response to the campus shooting at Virginia Tech on April 17, 2007, which 
claimed the lives of 32 students, Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simmons produced a report on 
college campus-targeted violence on behalf of the United States Secret Service, 
Department of Education, and the FBI.39 This report highlighted that a college 
environment is very different from that of elementary and high schools, as students are not 
in constant contact with teachers and administrators at college, campuses take up a much 
larger physical space, and students live on campus as opposed to just attending school 
there.40 These facts make identifying pre-attack behaviors much more challenging. The 
study looked at the number of targeted violence events at universities from 1900 through 
2010 by decade and found 162 incidents from 1990 to 2010 compared to 110 incidents 
from 1900 to 1990.41 In 53 percent of the cases, actors exhibited signs of pre-attack 
behaviors, which included stalking, verbal, or written threats, and physically abusive 
                                               
36 Vossekuil et al., 11. 
37 Vossekuil et al., 21. 
38 Vossekuil et al., 21. 
39 Diana Drysdale and William Modzeleski, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions 
of Higher Education (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, Department of Education, and Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2010), 1–33. 
40 Drysdale and Modzeleski, 4. 
41 Drysdale and Modzeleski, 11. 
10 
acts.42 This work, while explaining the unique problem facing universities in addressing 
targeted violence, did not expand the ideas of threat assessment.  
Additional works in the field of threat assessment have been consistent in 
explaining the deep complexity in understanding and dealing with those who may pose a 
threat. These works have also been consistent in highlighting that additional work is needed 
to help combat lone wolf shooters and targeted violence in schools. Numerous works have 
described how methods like physical barriers in schools have been ineffective because they 
do not address the goal-related behaviors and the willingness of the actor to circumvent 
established security practices.43  
In 2014, Gill, Horgan, and Deckert conducted a study of 119 incidents committed 
by lone-actor terrorists during the period between 1978 and 2015, which occurred in North 
America and Europe. The subjects studied included those who died during the commission 
of their attacks, or subsequently convicted for the crime. For the parameters of the study, 
terrorism was defined as the use or threat of violence designed to “influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and/or the use or threat is 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.”44 The study 
found that outside of the sample being overwhelmingly male, no uniform variables 
reflecting a majority of the group were identified. The study concluded that in 63.9% of 
the cases, people close to the subject were aware of the intent to engage in violence due to 
statements made by the offender.45 It was also found that lone-actor terrorist acts were 
rarely impulsive and committed a detectable activity, which suggests that subjects are best 
identified through their actions. These finding are all consistent with the findings of the 
exceptional case study of assassins. This study also gave insight to the popular perception 
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that lone actors remain isolated while their grievances manifest into violent planning and 
action. The study found that 62% of those studied maintained contacts with either radical 
extremist or other individuals involved in terrorist activities.46 
In 2017, Gill, Silver, Horgan, and Corner conducted a case study of 115 mass 
murders in the United States between 1990 and 2014, and concluded that mass murder, 
defined in this study as having four or more victims, was a relatively rare event.47 The 
study reported that murders involving more than one person accounted for less than 4% of 
the total victims over the 24-year study.48 Furthermore, the results of the study found “that 
mass murderer attacks are usually the culmination of a complex mix of personal, political 
and social drivers that crystalize at the same time to drive the individual down the path of 
violent action.”49 It also found that the likelihood of an attack occurring following the 
intensification of a grievance was often a mixture of target availability and vulnerability 
combined with the subjects’ psychological and technical capability.50 Findings of the study 
important to threat assessment investigations include that the mass murders are very similar 
to lone-actor terrorists, have no discernable profile, leak information about their intentions, 
are rarely sudden or impulsive, and are not categorically socially isolated. 
In 2018, Bakker, Gill, and Bouhana expanded on their previous study published 
four years before and examined 55 cases of lone-actor extremists in Europe and North 
America between 1978 and 2015. They examined lone-actor attack planning and 
preparation methods to gain insight into pre-attack behavior.51 The study found that 
detecting and pre-emptively stopping lone actors is more difficult than stopping whole 
groups due to the lack of ties to co-conspirators, but also found that on many occasions, 
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the lone actor is not as socially isolated as has been previously believed, with 53% of those 
studied having ties to extremist groups or movements.52 Social ties were found to play a 
significant role in the development of an individual’s motivation and during the planning 
phase of these crimes.53  
Other findings of the study highlighted the fact that the majority of lone actors are 
unconcerned with operation security, convey their intentions to others, and sustain social 
ties which are important in the evolution and planning phase of their intended violent 
attack.54 Their analysis found that the planning and preparation of these types of attacks 
occurred months, and sometimes years, before any violent action took place, and that the 
current lone-actor “type” was based on exceptions, not statistical observation.55 The study 
also notes that those lone actors who consider operational security, and do not have ties, 
(or if they do, do not share information with those ties), are in the minority of total overall 
lone actors, and are the hardest to detect and possibly the most lethal. Two examples of 
lone actors who engaged in these types of operational security were Theodore Kaczynski, 
and Anders Breivik of Norway.56 Other findings of the study include that lone actor 
terrorism is not a mental health issue in the majority of the studied cases, and that past 
violent behavior is the best future predictor of future violence. In the course of planning 
and preparing for these attacks it was discovered that 49% of those studied had contact 
with authorities, and 27% were suspected of terrorism-related activities.57  
2. Social Network Analysis  
SNA has been defined as a collection of tools developed to provide the researcher 
with the ability to understand better patterns of interdependent relationships in hard-to-
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detect networks.58 SNA uses these tools to expand on the ability of the human memory to 
process and identify network patterns. SNA focuses largely on social connectivity 
indicators, such as social gatherings and centers of worship, as well as the relationships 
developed between individuals. The number of ties one person has to another person is 
meaningful in the study of SNA, as is the determination of how interaction patterns affect 
both individual and collective group behavior.59 
The development of SNA has grown from the fields of psychology, sociology, and 
anthropology. The primary roots of classic SNA are grounded in the Gestalt psychology 
methods, which were attributed to the work of Wolfgang Kohler in the 1920s.60 Kohler’s 
research focused on the structure of organized patterns of thoughts and perceptions; these 
methods suggested that organized patterns of thought determined individual thoughts, 
which led to the idea of social determination.61 Modern SNA is rooted in the work of 
Milgram and Mitchell in the late 1960s. Milgram conducted a test using random people to 
record connectivity to a target person, which led to the conception of the phrase “six 
degrees of separation.”62 Mitchell codified SNA as a pattern of links individuals have with 
others, and the links others have within a specified group. His position was that networks 
are created from a transfer of information, goods, and services.63 
In 1973, Granovetter researched the strength of interpersonal ties and their resulting 
social implications. Ties were described as strong, weak, or non-existent, and defined as a 
“combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the 
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reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”64 He found that because weak ties linked 
members of different small groups, these ties were more important for integration into 
communities, as they exposed the people to networks outside of their own. Strong ties were 
found to be associated with cohesion in one group, which limited opportunities for 
integration. In 2006, Patacchini and Zenou took these principles and applied them to 
criminal activities.65 This research similarly found that weak ties caused an increase in 
criminal activities and caused increased transitions into crime for persons who previously 
had not been involved in criminal activity.66 
This research has not discovered a source that has used SNA to address crimes of 
targeted violence specifically; it has been extensively used in the closely related fields of 
terrorism and criminal activity. Following the attack of 9/11, SNA was heavily researched 
for use against terrorist organizations; Krebs provided a network map of the 9/11 hijacking 
groups using SNA. Using ties, such as attendance at the same college, using the same 
address to purchase flight tickets, and attending the same flight school, Krebs was able to 
connect all 19 hijackers in one map.67 This connectivity is significant when considering 
that this group was covert, or part of the dark network, with numerous members on the 
same flight being unknown to each other until the last minute.68 His research determined 
that three main difficulties arose in dealing with dark networks that must be addressed, or 
at least considered when analyzing such social ties. The first difficulty is the evolving 
nature of dark networks, which leads to constant change. The second difficulty is the 
incompleteness of data, as dark networks are designed to be secretive. The final challenge 
lies in determining the boundaries of the network.69 
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In the field of criminal investigations and predictive behavior, Fox conducted a 
study of criminal gangs in Arizona utilizing five years of police field interview reports to 
create a social network map of the organization.70 His research looked at the gang members 
in terms of the four levels of centrality, which include degree, closeness, betweenness, and 
eigenvector.  
Degree centrality is the measure of the number of ties held by an individual node. 
“Degree centrality suggests that those who have the most ties are the most central to the 
network, but they are not necessarily the most strategic actors.”71 Fox explained closeness 
centrality as taking into account the distance between the nodes in the network. Nodes are 
the representation of people or in an SNA usually designated by a circle, and ties are the 
link between two nodes generally designated with a line.72 “Closeness centrality is 
calculated as the number of other nodes in the network divided by the sum of the geodesic 
distances between that node and all other nodes in the network.”73 Betweenness centrality 
is “the proportion of shortest distance communication chains included in a given node.”74 
This measure relates to the amount of information that the person would control, which in 
turn, would raise its importance within the network. Eigenvector centrality indicates “that 
individuals are important to a network” because they themselves are centrally located and 
are tied to others who are centrally influential.75 “Thus, the centrality of one’s friends is 
taken into account by including not just who you know, but also [the persons] your friends 
know.”76 A person who has ties to multiple individuals of influence will presumably have 
greater network influence.77 
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As a result of this research, Fox concluded that betweenness centrality was 
important for understanding criminal networks, as it most allows for a social position that 
provides connections to different groups, information, and opportunities.78 He also 
discovered “that network centrality can enhance the likelihood of arrests” for the subjects 
who belonged to gangs.79 
In 1986, Krohn used SNA to examine how social networks can act as a restraint on 
delinquent behavior in juveniles.80 From his research, he developed the hypothesis, “the 
higher the density of the network structure of the community, the lower the rate of 
delinquent behavior.”81 Network density describes the ratio of all connected ties in a 
network; the measurement is derived by comparing the observed ties in network to the 
maximum possible ties.82 It is with mentioning that this maximum density in a network is 
achieved only if everyone in the network knows each other.83 
In 2008, Johnson et al. conducted a test in cooperation with the Richmond Virginia 
Police Department to incorporate SNA into the current crime analysis methodologies of 
the agency.84 This research incorporated examining offender ties in terms of positive or 
negative ties. Positive ties are characterized as being cooperative in nature, such as those 
between family or friends, or criminal partners.85 Negative ties are described as those with 
hostile intentions towards each other, an example being the perpetrators of a crime, and 
their victims.86 The SNA program’s use in the Richmond Police Department led to arrests 
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in a shooting and a string of robberies, from which the analysts using SNA uncovered case-
critical information, which was previously unknown to the detective working the case.87 
The police found SNA mapping information was easily accessed by analysts and could be 
effectively shared with investigators.88 
In 2016, Green et al. used SNA to analyze more than 130,000 people in Chicago 
over an eight-year period in an effort to determine if gun violence spreads though social 
networks.89 The research focused on gun-based violence spreading though a flu-like 
epidemic of social interactions described as social contagion, which was defined as “the 
spread of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors through social interactions.”90 The research 
found that social contagion accounted for 63.1% of the more than 10,000 shooting 
instances that occurred during the research period.91 These findings accounted for better 
predictive models of those who will be involved in gun violence, compared to the 
demographic models previously in use, which allowed for potentially preventative 
strategies to be implemented in the researched region. 
Kathleen Carley, the head of the Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University, has been involved in 
numerous research projects involving the use of SNA to examine covert terrorist 
organizations, including predictive modeling techniques.92 Focusing on relationships of 
interest (ROI), Carley’s team built a predictive model to identify the members of a covert 
network using “triad closure.”93 Triad closure is described as “person i has a dyad with 
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person j and person j has a dyad with person k, then there is a higher than chance likelihood 
that person i and person k have a dyad.”94 Her team’s research also found that a “group’s 
behavior, values, and/or performance can be articulated by understanding the relationships 
that exist within the group.”95 This finding supports the use of social identity theory (SIT) 
to interpret the findings of an SNA project. SIT, which was conceived by Turner and Tajfel 
as a means to explain how groups influence individual’s actions, is important in this 
research for understanding the data produced though an SNA examination.96 SIT is further 
defined and examined later in this paper. 
Cunningham et al. have also done important work in using SNA to understand and 
disrupt dark or covert networks. One of the principles of the research, and the strength of 
SNA, is the understanding that “people are substantially influenced by the behavior and 
choices of other actors around them-both directly and indirectly.”97 Their research has 
found that a key to understanding a network’s capacity and resiliency lies with an 
understanding of the network’s topography.98 Topographical features of a dark network 
are measured by determining the density and centralization of the network. Centrality 
differs from centralization in that it attempts to identify central actors, whereas 
centralization is “about the distribution of a centrality score throughout an entire 
network.”99 The measures of network topography are described as very dense on one side, 
and very sparse on the other. An additional measure found important in understanding the 
structure of dark networks is the subgroups classification. Subgroups, listed in the 
Appendix, are important because of the intimate interaction implied, which in turn, 
“amplifies the peer effect that governs people’s actions and constraints.”100 The research 
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concluded by describing the challenges faced in attempting to analyze dark networks, 
starting with the fact that they are all unique and can evolve very rapidly.101 Social ties are 
continually added and severed, and the nature of ties are frequently unclear, but as the 
science continues to evolve, much more is being understood, and further research has the 
potential for important discoveries in the field. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research has compiled profiles on two known perpetrators of targeted violence 
to determine whether the use of SNA can provide data, or substantial evidence, that will 
correctly lead an investigator to explore a suspect as a possible threat. Research for this 
thesis has utilized both information taken from the secondary research of case studies of 
previous actors of targeted violence, and from the profiles assembled after extensive 
research on these actors, to determine whether SNA can be used to enhance the success 
rate of threat assessment investigations. The subjects of the case studies are determined by 
the amount of relevant open-source information available. First, the subjects are analyzed 
under a current threat assessment. Next, the subjects are classified under a dimensional 
system, and vulnerabilities that may help investigators are discussed. The research of these 
two methods attempts to provide a possible new way to compare categories of lone actors 
across different crimes. Finally, the test cases are reviewed to determine if a social network 
component can assist an investigator in determining the meaning behind potentially 
significant behaviors through an analysis of a suspect’s social ties.  
The primary objective of this research is to create a model that expands on the 
current field of threat assessment by adding importing informational elements, which are 
currently underdeveloped. This model may also allow for the person conducting the 
investigation to observe changes over time that may show that the subject under 
investigation is moving toward a path of violence. A successful test may result in the SNA 
model revealing information significant enough to lead an investigator to decide that 
further investigation of a subject is warranted. However, since the only true test of this 
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model is only on a person who has not yet committed an act of targeted violence, the results 
are only provided to prove that the concept has validity. The traditional model of threat 
assessment has been developed from existing open-source literature on the subject and 
examines the case study subjects’ mental health history (including evidence of desperation, 
despair, or suicidal thoughts), criminal history, interest in prior attacks or previous 
assailants, approaching or visiting potential target(s), attack planning, obtaining or 
practicing with weapons, and communication of threats.  
The threat assessment model using the SNA enhancement examines the profiles of 
targeted violence actors with the same indicators used in the traditional model, as well as 
an examination of memberships in social organizations, political organizations, groups 
followed on the internet, family relationships, social network of friends, and religious 
affiliations. The importance of using social network analytics in this method is the attempt 
to collect and analyze social influences on the actions of targeted violence actors, which 
are currently underrepresented in threat assessment models. When examined through the 
lens of SIT, it is understood that social ties can inspire individuals to perform tremendous 
acts of violence, as with terrorist organizations, but can also impose constraints on people’s 
behavior.102 The more meaningful social ties people possess, the more their behavior will 
be constrained or modified to the groups that have captured their loyalty. The fewer in-
groups people align themselves with, the fewer constraints that will inhibit or modify their 
behavior and choices. SNA is a way to reflect these ties to understand better whether 
people’s ties are influencing a pathway to violence. 
The number of targeted violence subjects examined through this threat assessment 
process was limited by the availability of reliable open-source information. This lack of 
availability is a potential limiting factor, as the assessment model is designed to ask specific 
questions during the assessment process, which in this case, cannot be asked. Threat 
assessments are designed for a two-stage process, the first, a determination of the likelihood 
that the subject is capable of an attack, and the second, a determination of whether the 
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subject is moving toward violent actions. This examination occurs after the fact, so it is 
already known that the subject is capable of the attack.  
The goal of this research is to create a model for use in the future development of 
threat assessment methodology. The research seeks to provide a better understanding of 
how certain social ties enable and constrain individuals within their relationships. The 
research may also determine whether targeted violence actors have a similar lack of social 
constraints enabling action on their violent thoughts. The research also suggests a strategy 
to utilize these methods in the form of threat assessment programs for any law enforcement 
agency, school, or mental health professional tasked with identifying potential threats. 
E. BACKGROUND 
Targeted violence refers to “situations in which an identifiable perpetrator poses a 
threat of violence to a particular individual or group.”103 Incidents of targeted violence 
include lone wolf shooters, school attackers, and assassins of public officials. The traits 
commonly found in these groups include a perceived grievance, experiencing depression, 
and undergoing a personal crisis.104 Further similarities have been exhibited in the 
planning and execution of attacks towards the targeted victims due to an emotional 
response to a perceived slight against themselves or a person or group with whom they 
identified. The increase of individuals acting alone in these attacks has seen a marked 
increase since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. From 1970 to 1995, individuals 
unaffiliated with an extremist group made up 6.5% of all attacks; however, from 1995 to 
2007, that figure has risen to comprise 33% of all attacks.105 
Targeted violence actors are difficult to identify before they commit an attack, 
either due to isolation, or due to a tendency only to exchange their views with similar-
minded people who are unlikely to alert authorities. These actors can be difficult to detect, 
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even when coming into contact with law enforcement, because of hard-to-detect, or 
deliberately disguised signals. These actors do not fit into a universally applicable profile 
for all situations, but targeted violent acts have been shown to be the result of detectable 
behavior.106 However, the detection of these frequently insignificant behaviors and the 
resulting protective intelligence program may be more labor intensive and time consuming 
than many law enforcement agencies have the resources to expend.  
An important component in the attempt to discover targeted violence actors prior 
to their committing a violent act is a protective intelligence program. This program consists 
of three major functions: identification, assessment, and case management.107 After 
identifying a person who may pose a threat, a threat assessment investigation should be 
conducted to evaluate mental or social pressures that may lead to violence. If detectable 
behaviors or mental conditions are deemed to be potentially dangerous, further 
investigation, leading to a threat management program, is the best course of action.108 
Behaviors uncovered in a threat assessment model that may lead to additional investigation 
include a subject’s interest in violence, planning behaviors, and communications of 
intentions.109 Threat assessment is limited to the ability of the investigator to uncover 
information that the subject often is attempting to hide, and to interpret information of 
varying importance from differing types of potentially threatening actors. The prediction 
of violent behavior is conditional, as it is based on a changing set of mental and 
environmental variables, but the best chance for a correct indication is if all the relevant 
information can be obtained and analyzed, and the subject can be monitored for planning 
or attack related behaviors.110 
Motivation, which is a key component to understanding why subjects commit acts 
of targeted violence, is described as a “goal-directed attention toward planning, preparing, 
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and ultimately committing an act of terrorist violence.”111 The intention to kill others is 
described as a complex process involving multiple factors, notably the “interaction 
between the person and the frictions present in his or her environment.”112 Frictions, or 
those external factors that influence a person’s decision to pursue a pathway to violence, 
often change over time; in other words, the factors that initiate the interest may be different 
from the final factors that influence the decision actually to commit the violent act.113 
Change in these frictions can cause significant changes to the perceived outcome, which 
can result in changing the targets or abandoning the plan all together. Motivations for 
assassination were found to include “wishes for notoriety, revenge, idiosyncratic thinking 
about the target, hopes to be killed, interest in bringing about political change, and desires 
for money.”114 Motivations for school shooters included revenge, trying to solve a 
problem, suicide or desperation, and recognition.115 
One of the key motivating factors revolves around grievances that have relevance 
in a high number of targeted violence cases and found in 67% of all subjects at the time of 
the incidents in the Preventing Assassination Case Study.116 The percentage of school 
shooters who had a grievance was 81% of those studied for The Final Report and Findings 
of the Safe School Initiative.117 Grievances are frequently acted against those who the 
subject feels are responsible for the situation, as in the case of Sirhan who assassinated 
Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968. Sirhan, a Palestinian-American held two grievances. He 
was unhappy with his income and living condition, and he also felt the Palestinian people 
were being unfairly treated by Israel and Americans who supported them. Sirhan had no 
personal grievance against Kennedy but held him responsible for the plight of the 
Palestinian people due to his support of the planned sale of U.S. F-15 fighter jets to Israel. 
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Another motivating factor is the adaptation of a violent or extreme ideology 
typically referred to as becoming “radicalized.” The motives of many who commit violent 
actions after becoming radicalized or self-radicalized are often time more complex than 
just acting in the interests of the ideology. Many who commit violent acts have little 
knowledge about the doctrine that their acts are reflecting, and few experiences with what 
would be considered a traditional radicalization process.118 Borum writes that in seeking 
answers to why people engage in terrorism, many look to “overly simplistic explanations,” 
and are predisposed to use the political connection as the master explanation when the truth 
is usually far more complex.119 He goes on to explain this complexity of understanding 
these relationships by stating:  
The relationship between ideas or ideologies and behavior moves in both 
directions. Some people attach to a grievance because they adhere to a 
particular ideology, but others gravitate toward an ideology because they 
hold a particular grievance. conviction and commitment to a cause may 
precede his or her willingness to participate in violence but participating in 
violence may also strengthen a person’s conviction and commitment to a 
cause.120 
While some lone offenders are ultimately converted by a particular ideology, and 
eventually commit violence, this situation is not typical.121 
SIT was conceived in the late 20th century by social psychologists John Turner and 
Henri Tajfel as a means to explain how people’s sense of self is often heavily based on 
their memberships in, or association with, various in-groups and social units.122 Humans 
are inherently social beings, and SIT maintains that their placement within various groups 
(such as family, social organizations, socioeconomic class, political party/affiliation, etc.) 
provides a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and responsibility. Victims of cults, members 
of terrorist organizations, and other damaging social organizations often cite feelings of 
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belonging and “being a part of something,” as major characteristics that attracted them to 
the organization in the first place. SIT holds that to improve self-images, people often seek 
to increase or improve the status of those groups people consider themselves to be a part 
of, or their “in-group.”123 In-groups often inspire some form of prejudice against those 
who are not in the group, which are considered “out-groups.” Out-groups and in-groups 
almost always lead to an “us” versus “them” mentality among those in social situations, as 
viewing themselves or their organization/group/affiliation/etc., as superior to other’s helps 
contribute to people’s self-esteem.124 This mentality can take many forms, some as benign 
as a friendly rivalry between fans of two teams in any given sport. However, on a larger 
and more serious scale, strong senses of in- and out-groups can inspire genuine concepts 
of out-groups as enemies. This factor contributes to the conception of many terrorist 
organizations. Group membership with these organizations gives individuals a sense of 
belonging, or an in-group fighting against their cause, which is usually the destruction of 
an out-group. One of the main ideas of SIT is that an in-group’s evaluation of the out-group 
will likely be negative in relation to its positive evaluation.125 People’s social identity can 
be more influential in decision making than their personal identity, with their self-image 
closely tied to group membership.126 “Critical to this process is that once individuals define 
themselves as members of a group, there is pressure for them to assume the characterization 
of the group as positive.”127 
These social ties within terrorist organizations can inspire individuals to perform 
tremendous acts of violence; however, these ties can also be utilized by the same 
organization to impose constraints on their behavior. When part of an in-group that is very 
important to their self-image, people are going to consciously make decisions and act in 
ways that will benefit their in-group. As Brannan states, “Because our group memberships 
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become parts of our identity, and value associated with those groups will have implications 
for our feelings of self-worth.”128 Individuals who possess a strong patron/client 
relationship to an in-group are likely to have their behavior constrained or modified by the 
groups that have captured their loyalty. Conversely, individuals who do not have in-groups 
to align themselves with will not be constrained. This lack of constraint in the cases of 
many lone wolf shooters, especially students who commit school shootings, can be 
disastrous. Some of the attackers in school shootings did not have an in-group with which 
to align themselves, and if their peers and teachers bully or ignore them, these shooters 
may consider the entire school to be an “out-group” or enemy that needs to be attacked.129 
The methodology of using SNA to help inform threat assessment investigations is 
complimented through the understanding of SIT. To be successful, threat assessment 
investigations seek to understand as much about the subject as possible. One method of 
obtaining needed information is through interviews of the subjects, such as “employers, 
coworkers, neighbors, relatives, associates, and, caregivers.”130 These groups are all 
inclusive of an SNA of the subject. The additional methodology of SIT allows for the 
inclusion of group membership and the examination of the subjects though the full lens of 
ties created by their network. In effect, SNA creates the roadmap of the subjects’ influential 
relationships, and SIT provides the key to unlock the meaning. 
F. RELEVANCE AND GOAL 
Targeted violence incidents in the United States show every indication of becoming 
more common and more lethal. The continued threat from targeted violence actors has risen 
with few answers to combat the threat. Although numerous shooting events like Columbine 
High School have occurred over the past 20 years, improving measures to detect or prevent 
targeted violence events show little signs of being created. New methods are needed to 
detect information previously not recorded and analyze the information with tools not 
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previously employed. Current threat assessment models may be focusing too heavily on 
mental health data, and not enough on social influences, such as the lack of group 
membership that may act as a restraint against committing violence. Additionally, since 
these actors frequently go through cycles that lead to the violent acts, mapping models can 
be important to show differences in their behavior over time when law enforcement have 
multiple contacts with them. A 2018 study found that lone actors have considerably more 
social ties than previously believed, and that “86% of lone actors communicated their 
radical convictions to others.”131 It is extremely important to identify anyone close to the 
subjects who can potentially be interviewed to provide relevant information to the threat 
assessment.132 In the example of Timothy McVeigh, when attackers have a support 
network, understanding who is in that support network is very important. If McVeigh is 
considered a threat and Terry Nichols is arrested for stealing explosives, a computer-
generated alert should be sent to the case agent that shows the relationship and prompts 
further investigation into both men.  
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II. CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT MODELS 
A. EXCEPTIONAL CASE STUDY THREAT ASSESSMENT MODEL 
Many of the threat assessment models currently being used, including that of the 
United States Secret Service, are based on the report of the findings from the Exceptional 
Case Study Project. That report resulted in a guide published in January 2000 by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, titled Protective Intelligence Threat 
Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials.133 
This report is intended to guide law enforcement in the methods and reasoning behind 
threat assessment investigations. The results of the Exceptional Case Study Project were 
derived from an examination of 83 people who had attacked or attempted to attack a public 
figure from 1949 to 1996. Targets of these attacks included “Presidents, Members of 
Congress, Federal Judges, prominent national political leaders, State and city officials, 
business executives, and entertainment, sports, and media celebrities.”134 
The key findings of the report were that attacks are the result of “understandable 
and often discernible processes and thinking and behavior,” the majority of subjects saw 
the attack “as the means to a goal or a way to solve a problem,” and that target selection 
and motive are connected.135 
The guide reported that attacks are planned and not spontaneous occurrences, target 
selection is deliberate, and planning sometimes takes years. The attackers will often 
rehearse the attack, and the planning will frequently consume their lives and provide a 
sense of meaning that eases their emotional pain and allows them to rectify a perceived 
grievance.136 The study found that eight motives were most prevalent, “to achieve 
notoriety or fame; to bring attention to a perceived wrong; to retaliate for a perceived 
injury; To end personal pain, to be removed from society, to be killed; to save the country 
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or the world, to fix a problem; To develop a special relationship with the target; To make 
money; To bring about political change.”137 
The study suggests that an investigator should obtain information on the subject 
based on three categories: personal identifiers, background information, and current life 
situation.138 Identifiers include standard information that may help identify people 
associated with the subject, such as family and friend information, work history, military 
history, and current and former addresses. A social network map of the subject may be very 
helpful to an investigator during this process. It should include an ego network analysis, 
which includes people and organizations that have a direct tie to the subject, and a two-
step expansion of the subject’s network. The two-step expansion includes the network of 
the people who have direct ties to the subject who can then potentially give an indication 
of isolation or radicalization.  
Background information includes data intended to illuminate “behaviors, interests, 
and lifestyles of subjects that may influence their motivations, or capacity to attempt an 
attack.”139 This information includes criminal history, mental health history, a history of 
grievances, and “interest in extremist ideas or radical groups; and travel history, especially 
in the previous year.”140  
Current life situation is information intended to determine if a person is in a life 
transition, crisis, or in an unstable living situation.141 The finding of the study that some 
attackers engaged in violence due to their current living environment frames the basis for 
obtaining this information. The guide suggests obtaining the following information from 
the subject of threat assessment investigation: is the person in a “stable living situation, 
with basic needs,” and how does the current living situation compare to past living 
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conditions project a downward course.142 Other considerations are the loss of employment 
or the end or a marriage, the loss of important contacts and supports, the death of someone 
close, and desperate or suicidal thoughts.143 
The study also found that most attacks were preceded by discernible attack related 
behaviors, which were often “observed by people in the subject’s life.”144 These warning 
signs include an interest in murder or assassination, or acts “of violence directed at public 
officials, visiting sites connected with assassinations, and emulating assassins.”145 Notes 
in a diary about committing an attack can include planning notes regarding the targets 
travel, law enforcement protective measures, or efforts to obtain a weapon.146 By 
“communicating an inappropriate interest” in a potential target, the study found that 
attackers rarely “communicate a direct threat to their target or law enforcement,” but often 
communicated their intentions to relatives, coworkers, neighbors, or others.147 Other signs 
include visiting a site linked to a possible target, even while this site may not have an 
immediately understood relevance to the target.  
B. THREAT ASSESSMENT MODEL
Based on the finding of the Preventing Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional
Case Study Project, the National Institute of Justice printed the Protective Intelligence 
Threat Assessment Investigations. This publication is described as a guide for state and 
local law enforcement officials who conduct threat investigations.148 The following 10 
questions, which are taken directly from the guide, are recommended for investigators to 
ask the assessment subject and collateral sources while conducting a threat assessment.149 
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1. What motivated the subject to make the statement or take the action that 
caused  him or her to come to attention? 
2. What if anything has the subject communicated to someone else (target, 
law enforcement, family, friends, colleagues, associates) or written in a 
diary or journal concerning his or her intentions? 
3. Has the subject shown an interest in any of the following? Assassins or 
assassinations, weapons, militant or radical ideas/groups, murders, 
murderers, mass murderers, and workplace violence and stalking 
incidents. 
4. Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, harassing, 
and/or stalking-type behaviors? These behaviors combine an inappropriate 
interest with any of the following: Developing an attack idea or plan, 
approaching, visiting, and/or following the target, approaching, visiting, 
and/or following the target with a weapon, attempting to circumvent 
security, assaulting, or attempting to assault a target. 
5. Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command 
hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution etc., with 
indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs? 
6. How organized is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to plan 
and execute a violent action against a target? 
7. Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing desperation and/or 
despair? Has the subject experienced a recent personal loss and/or loss of 
status? Is the subject now, or has the subject ever been suicidal? 
8. Is the subject’s “story” consistent with his or her actions? 
9. Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might act based 
on inappropriate ideas? 
10. What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase or 
decrease the likelihood that the subject will attempt to attack a target or 
targets?150 
These questions are designed to help understand the mental process of the subject 
in an attempt to decide if the individual is moving toward a path of violence. These 
questions are also designed to provide a baseline about a “subject’s thinking and actions at 
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a certain point in time.”151 This information can be very important if at a later date the 
subject is the focus of another investigation to determine a possible change in thoughts or 
behaviors.152 While these questions make up the core information to be obtained during a 
threat investigative interview, they do not preclude other questions that should address any 
unresolved issues for a particular case.153 
C. COMPARATIVE UNITED KINGDOM THREAT ASSESSMENT MODEL
The United Kingdom, the closest ally to the United States in the war against terror,
has also suffered a series of significant terrorist attacks. These attacks have included the 
subway bombing in 2005 that killed 52, and injured more than 700, and the attack in 
Manchester following a concert by a radicalized lone wolf who killed 23.154 A Europol 
annual report revealed that in 2017, the United Kingdom experienced 36 casualties, more 
than any other European country that year due to terrorist attacks.155 These victims resulted 
from ISIS inspired attacks in Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park, and the 
previously mentioned Manchester attacks. The report also stated that the United Kingdom 
experienced the highest number of attacks both completed and disrupted and had the most 
prosecutions of terrorists at 125.156 The attacks are said to target crowds of people to cause 
higher casualty rates. According to the report, the majority of these attackers were 
radicalized within the United Kingdom without traveling abroad.157 
In addition to sharing the challenges of dealing with terrorism and lone offenders, 
the United Kingdom shares similarities within its legislative, legal, law enforcement and 
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health care systems to that of the United States, so its programs will have the same type of 
challenges in terms of the rights of its citizens and privacy protections. In 2006, the United 
Kingdom created a Fixated Threat Assessment Center (FTAC) in London to respond to 
threats to public figures from lone attackers who are mentally ill or pathologically fixated. 
This center combined mental health workers from the National Health Service (NHS) and 
police from the Metropolitan Police Service who work together to discover and address 
individuals’ mental illness that can pose a threat.158  
The creation of this center was founded with the realization that in contrast to 
groups whose motives were frequently understandable, lone offenders, especially those 
with mental illness, had motivations that were difficult to understand, and were 
unpredictable. This program identified that for these cases, traditional law enforcement 
investigative strategies did not have a high level of success, and that education and 
combining different expertise was needed.159 The pilot program was funded following a 
three-year research study that examined behaviors of individuals who attacked elected 
officials and members of the Royal Family in the United Kingdom and determined that the 
main risk to public figures in the United Kingdom was not terrorists, but from lone 
individuals with mental disorders of pathological fixation.160  
The operation of the FTAC begins as individuals are referred to the center. The 
second step involves a joint assessment, followed by appropriate intervention and long-
term management. The center does not detain individuals but refers them for mental health 
treatment or legal intervention.161 Follow up from the center includes home visits, family 
contact, and liaison with regional forensic psychiatric services. Part of the pilot program 
involved the center conducting a statistical study of the individuals it encountered. Some 
of those statistics showed that 53% of the people referred to the center resulted in 
                                               
158 David James et al., “The Fixated Threat Assessment Centre: Preventing Harm and Facilitating 
Care,” The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 21 (August 1, 2010): 521–36, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14789941003596981.  
159 James et al., 522–523. 
160 James et al., 522–523. 
161 James et al., 530–532. 
35 
compulsory admission to a hospital, 26% were referred to mental health teams for 
treatment, 4% for FTAC management, while just 2% were arrested and prosecuted.162 
Threat levels of the FTAC evaluate subjects as high, medium, and low. The study reported 
that the FTAC had managed 80% of the cases referred down to low levels of concern from 
the original high and medium assessment.163 
The report discusses the strengths of the program as:  
The power of FTAC’s intervention lies in producing detailed packages of 
information about each individual, which provide evidence of the 
underlying problems and/or pathology, and also point to possible 
management and treatment options. The combination of information from 
policing sources with information available to local psychiatric services is 
illuminating and amounts to more than the sum of its individual parts.164  
The FTAC has the important role of follow through, case management, and 
ensuring that individuals who pose a threat do not slip through the cracks between the law 
enforcement and medical realms. The study concluded with the statement that the pilot 
program had been a resounding success, won a 2009 Association of Chief Police Officers 
Excellence award, and recommended the expansion to stalking and homicide 
prevention.165 
David James, who was a member of the study conducted on fixated people that led 
to the development of the FTAC, and is part of the center operations, stated that of the 24 
violent attacks in Europe not related to terrorism, mentally disordered individuals “were 
responsible for most of the fatal incidents and serious injuries, and most had given warnings 
which had gone unrecognized.”166 Some of the operational advantages of the FTAC 
revolve around the doctors from the NHS, as they can establish a medical history on 
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individuals otherwise unavailable to police. This medical background can be combined 
with the police background check to provide the doctors with the knowledge of the crimes 
that the person has committed. This background information can also clarify the overall 
picture and give the FTAC the ability to obtain a complete understanding of the potential 
threat in a fraction of the time it takes under the old method.167 In many cases, the FTAC 
is simply putting people back into the mental health services after they ceased treatment 
too soon, or is introducing individuals to a mental health service that had not previously 
been available. A 1996 example provided the case of Thomas Hamilton who wrote to the 
Queen that he “felt ostracized from his fellow men;” a week later he killed 16 children and 
a teacher at a school in Dunblane.168 According to police in the unit, the FTAC gives them 
an avenue to be part of the solution. Normally, police are unable to take action against 
mentally ill people if they are not acting on their delusions. Thus, authorities have few 
options available to them to intercede, but with the FTAC, they can intervene and help 
people before they turn violent.169  
An additional benefit of the FTAC has included the reduction of concerning 
behaviors, which decreases the number of police call outs that potentially allows police 
resources to focus on more important crimes and keeps mentally ill people out of the 
criminal justice system, which has led to wasted resources, time, and expense.170 The 
FTAC, like other threat assessment units, understands that threat management is a 
continuing process and not a single event. The center operates with the understanding that 
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it is also very hard to quantify results, as ultimately, it is not possible to know if the 
individual will carry out the attack.171  
In 2017, Victoria expanded the use of the FTAC to prevent radicalization and target 
lone wolf attacks. The 31-million-dollar center will have 25 investigators, intelligence 
analysts, and forensic mental health experts working together to address people who “make 
threats, are socially isolated and who could pose a risk of committing acts of terror or 
extreme violence.”172 
Another related pilot program, which began in 2016, combined NHS mental health 
practitioners with counter terrorism police. The objective of the pilot program is to improve 
police and health professionals’ knowledge of mental health considerations that lead to 
radicalization. The focus is on what support can be provided and how to best manage the 
risk of radicalization.173 
The Channel program is another effort in the United Kingdom designed to support 
individuals vulnerable to radicalization. The program exists in both England and Wales 
and is intended to combat all forms of extremism.174 The program is an early intervention 
attempt to steer people away from extremist viewpoints before they turn to violence. If a 
person is possibly becoming radicalized, that person can be referred by anyone to the local 
authorities or police.175 Following a referral, the case is discussed by the Channel Program 
panel, which is made up of representatives from personnel in health care, education, and 
law enforcement. The panel will then decide if the referred person needs assistance; if they 
determine the person is not at risk, the case is closed. If the panel determines that the person 
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needs assistance, a support package, which can include education, employment, healthcare, 
and ideological mentoring, will be offered. The program is confidential for both the 
reporting person and the subject referred to the program, and participation by the referred 
person is completely voluntary.176  
Another important component of the program is that those accepted for assistance 
are monitored on a monthly basis until such a time that they leave the program. This step 
is vital because people on a path to violence change over time, with consistent monitoring 
being the only reliable way to measure such change. The program started as a pilot in 2006 
and was extended to all jurisdictions in 2012, which culminated in 2015 when it was given 
statutory status under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015.177 From the period 
of January 2015 through December 2016, 7,631 individuals were referred to Channel. Out 
of this number, only 1,072 (14%) were discussed by a panel, and of that number, 381 were 
referred for support.178 Of the 381 who received support, 365 (96%) left the program, with 
302 deemed a successful reduction of their vulnerability, and 63 of their own volition. 
Those who leave on their own can be referred to the police if the threat is deemed to rise 
to a concerning level.179 Due to the confidentiality of the program, it is hard to determine 
the statistical success rates, but the expansion suggests that the United Kingdom has 
considered the program to be advantageous, which in and of itself, warrants further 
examination for its use in the United States.  
The United Kingdom’s method of having medical professionals and law 
enforcement officers work together and trained in their respected areas of expertise in threat 
assessment and management, shows far greater promise than current methods being 
employed in the United States to detect and prevent attacks by lone offenders. This method 
shows potential in expediting and providing information into an investigation where 
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everything is important and each piece of information increases the chance of success. It 
successfully removes important barriers and reinforces the fact that cooperation among 
different sectors in threat assessment is vital. 
The case of James Eagan Holmes is an example of the necessity of creating a 
collaborative unit of law enforcement and mental health professionals working together to 
mitigate mental health threats. On July 20, 2012, Holmes, dressed in black tactical gear 
and wearing a gas mask, entered an Aurora Colorado movie theater through an exit door 
that he had propped open, tossed in two gas canisters, and opened fire on the crowd during 
the midnight showing of “The Dark Knight Rises.”180 His shooting spree killed 12 people 
and injured 70 others, many of them severely.181 
Holmes’s background included no previous criminal history or acts of violence 
prior to the shootings at the Century 16 movie theater. He had graduated in the top 1% of 
his class at the University of California Riverside, and was a PhD student attending the 
University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus in Aurora, a suburb of Denver.182 
During his subsequent trial, Holmes was diagnosed by a court appointed psychiatrist with 
schizoaffective disorder combined with a social anxiety disorder, and that he understood 
right from wrong on the night of the shooting.183 Based on this diagnosis, the court rejected 
Holmes’s defense of insanity and found him guilty.184 
Holmes’s classmates describe a concerning change in his personality in the spring 
of 2012. On May 22, 2012, Holmes began to acquire weapons with a purchase of a semi-
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automatic handgun.185 Six days later, he purchased a shotgun, and then on June 7, Holmes, 
purchased an AR-15 assault rifle.186 His final purchase was for another semi-automatic 
handgun on July 6, as was the case with all four weapons purchases, Holmes bought the 
guns legally and passed the required background screening.187 During this time period, 
Holmes also began acquiring ammunition through purchases on the internet. He bought 
3,000 rounds for the rifle, 350 shells for the shotgun, and 3,000 rounds of handgun 
ammunition.188 Finally, Holmes bought magazines including a 100 round drum magazine 
for the AR-15 rifle, and on July 2, purchased tactical vests, pouches, and a knife from an 
online store.189 
Holmes kept detailed information in a notebook, which he mailed to his psychiatrist 
at the University of Colorado hours before his attack.190 The notebook discusses his 
decision to attack a mass gathering and details his planning of the attack with diagrams of 
the different theaters in the complex that include his eventual target.191 He visited the 
theater two weeks before the attack and wrote in the notebook that a police station was 
three minutes away, and a “99 percent” chance existed that he would be caught.192 
Holmes’s psychiatrist at the University of Colorado, Dr. Lynne Fenton, testified 
during the trial, “Holmes told her he wanted to kill as many people as possible, but that she 
did not believe she had the legal authority to place him on a mental-health hold because he 
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did not specify a target or plan.”193 Following the last time, she saw Holmes as a patient 
on June 11, 2012, Dr. Fenton reported Holmes as possibly dangerous to the university’s 
threat assessment team.194 Dr. Fenton testified that Holmes stated he was “having thoughts 
of killing people 3–4 times a day.”195 An official for the university stated that nothing that 
Holmes disclosed in his sessions with Dr. Fenton rose to the level of involuntary 
hospitalization under Colorado law. Dr. Fenton also contacted university police and 
inquired if Holmes had a criminal record, which he did not.196 The police officer contacted 
reported that Dr. Fenton “decided against an involuntary commitment because she thought 
Holmes was borderline,” and such an action would be inflammatory.197 The university 
police officer deactivated Holmes’s school identification card to ensure he could not enter 
any locked buildings.198 Neither the School police nor the school threat assessment team 
interviewed Holmes prior to his attack. 
This case highlights the challenges for both law enforcement and mental health 
professionals, who can find themselves in a position of trying to balance patient rights with 
their responsibilities to inform others of dangers. Holmes’s case also highlights a need for 
a system where law enforcement and mental health professionals can work together to 
prevent subjects from committing violent attacks. Finally, lessons should be learned to 
have both law enforcement and mental health professionals specialize in these types of 
investigations, because important aspects require experience. 
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1. Threat Management 
The goal of threat assessment is to identify people who will commit an act of 
targeted violence. The result of a threat assessment will lead an investigator to conclude 
that a subject is either not a threat or can be classified as one of three categories as defined 
in the Preventing Assassination Study.199 These categories include “Identification of 
persons who might pose a threat; assessment of persons who are identified as a potential 
threat; and case management of persons and groups deemed a threat to a protected 
person.”200 
To be successful, threat assessment programs should include a corresponding 
protective intelligence and threat management program.201 Threat management entails 
ensuring that an at-risk subject does not commit an act of targeted violence. Threat 
management can include many different aspects including surveillance and monitoring, as 
well as mental health and family involvement.202 In many instances, subjects who come 
to the attention of threat management investigators are experiencing personal crises, and 
just the act of reconnecting them with family, who may be unaware of their crises, or 
getting them help from a mental health professional, can break the grievance cycle before 
it enters the pathway to violence.203 The first priority of any threat management program 
is to prevent subjects deemed to be a threat, or those determined potentially to be a threat 
from completing a violent act.204 
2. Expanding the Use of Threat Assessment  
Within the academic community, considerable research has been conducted on 
various types of individuals who have committed public acts of violence, including lone-
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actor terrorists, assassins, mass murderers, and school shooters.205 Just one of these 
categories, the lone wolf terrorist, has been broken into four subcategories. The first is 
isolated individuals operating outside of any command and control called loners.206 The 
second classification is designated as a lone wolf, described as subjects who acted alone, 
but had assistance and direction from an extremist group.207 The third category is the lone 
wolf pack, which is formed when a small group self radicalizes.208 The final group is 
individuals directly controlled by extremist groups but carry out their attacks alone.209 
While the first group would be challenging for a SNA assessment, the second and third 
groups would likely result in maps that would prove invaluable to investigators. 
In studying these profiles, many different terms and definitions have been developed. 
For example, just the term “lone offender” has a multitude of meanings within the research 
community. In some studies, lone offenders are categorized as individuals who have acted 
alone and independent of a greater group, while some allow group contact within the definition 
if the act was committed alone. Others allow for one accomplice, and some do not allow for 
any accomplices.210 When categorizing lone-actor terrorism, some studies only include the 
traditional political or sociological motivation, while others recognize the legitimacy of 
personal motivations.211 In looking at the ways that threat assessment models can be used to 
help those in law enforcement better understand and ultimately attempt to intervene before an 
act of violence occurs, the definition and ultimately the motivation are not as important as 
identifying the clues that suggest a person has or may enter a pathway to violence. Borum 
suggests that definitions that identify and set parameters for the concept of lone-offender 
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terrorism only matter to the extent “that they facilitate or obscure effective policies or 
practices.”212 Since known profiles are not available, it may be more useful to analyze cases 
by their features rather than by type or category. 
The following section compares the statistics from previous case studies conducted on 
persons who have committed targeted violence and have relevance to threat assessment 
investigations. Table 1 has four columns. The first column is taken from the Preventing 
Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project. This case study examined 83 
persons who had attempted or succeeded in assassinating public officials in the United States 
between 1949 and 1997. The second column is taken from Bombing Alone: Tracing the 
Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists, a study based on 119 cases 
of lone-actor terrorist in Europe and North America between 1978 and 2015. The third 
column’s information is derived from Shooting Alone: The Pre-Attack Experiences and 
Behaviors of U.S. Solo Mass Murderers, which examined 115 mass murderers between 1990 
and 2014. The fourth and final column draws data from The Final Report and Findings of the 
Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, 
which identified 37 incidents and works backward from 2000 to the first school-based incident 
in 1974. 
Table 1. Comparison of Assassins, Lone Actor Terrorists, Mass 
Murderers, and School Shooters 
 A B C D 
Planning     
Prior to attack 80% N/A 85% 93% 
     
Mental Health      
Diagnosed Mental Health 
Disorder 
38% 32% 41% 17% 
History of depression/Stress 44% 74% 63% 61% 
Suicide thoughts or attempts 65% N/A N/A 78% 
     
Gender     
Men 86% 96% 96% 100% 
Women 14% 4% 4% 0% 
Table 1 continued on next page  
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Table 1 continued from previous page 
Age     
Average 35 33 33 N/A 
Range 16–73 15–69 15–69 11–21 
     
Marital Status     
Married 26% 25% 17% N/A 
Single/Never Married 51% 50% 43% N/A 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 23% 19% 13% N/A 
     
Education     
High School or Tech School 
Grad 
31% 25% 25% N/A 
College Graduate  15% 22% 11% 
Attended Graduate School 6% 20% 4% N/A 
 
Military History     
Military Service 42% 26% 18% N/A 
No Service 58% 74% 72% N/A 
     
Employment     
Unemployed 52% 40% 40% N/A 
Employed Full Time 35% 50% 50% N/A 
Disabled/Retired/Student 13% 10% N/A N/A 
     
Social Network     
Socially Isolated 60% 53% 26% 34% 
     
History of Arrest     
Prior Arrest Juvenile or Adult 66% 41% 43% 27% 
History of Violence 20% 38% 38% 31% 
     
Substance Abuse History     
History of Substance Abuse 39% 23% 44% 24% 
     
History of Grievances     
Grievances against Others 97% N/A 56% 81% 
     
Communication of Threat     
Communicated Threat to 
Others 
92% 64% 31% 81% 
 
Column A—Preventing Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project. This case study examined 83 
persons who had attempted or succeeded in assassinating public officials in the United States between 1949 and 1997. 
Column B—Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists. This case 
study examines 119 cases of lone actor terrorists in Europe and North America between 1978 and 2015. 
Column C—Shooting Alone: The Pre-Attack Experiences and Behaviors of U.S. Solo Mass Murderers. This case study 
examined 115 cases of mass murderers between 1990 and 2014. 
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Column D—The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School 
Attacks in the United States. This case study includes 37 cases of school shooters in the United States between 1974 and 
2000. 
While the treat assessment model developed from Preventing Assassination: Secret 
Service Exceptional Case Study Project was designed to identify assassins before they 
could act, evidence shows that each of these lone actor types share similar traits that may 
allow the threat assessment models to be used successfully across differing lone-actor 
categories. 
As the provided statistics indicate, while similarities exist between the 
classifications of targeted violence actors, no percentages in any category (aside from a 
male dominated category) suggests that a threat assessment may produce a single profile 
on which investigators can concentrate their efforts. For an investigator, focusing on the 
fact that males predominantly commit acts may cause an investigative bias, which can then 
lead to overlooking someone like Sarah Jane Moore, who attempted to assassinate 
President Gerald Ford on September 22, 1975.213 In fact, the statistics can be interpreted 
by deciding that investigations must look at all subjects under a different light, and examine 
their mental state for possible grievances and motivations, be it political or personal, etc. It 
also must be asked whether the subject is becoming radicalized, before attempting to render 
any conclusions about the subject. It is also important for the investigator to understand 
any possible motivation or grievance of the subject since motivations can provide insight 
into a potential target.  
The provided data should be analyzed with the understanding that target selection 
can change due to external circumstances, as in the case of Arthur Bremer, who originally 
traveled to Canada to attempt to assassinate then President Nixon.214 Finding that security 
measures prevented him from his goal, he then shifted his attention to presidential 
candidate George Wallace, whom he shot in May 1972.215 Almost half of the subjects in 
the Preventing Assassination Study considered attacking a target other than their eventual 
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ultimate target, as was the case of Mark Chapman who killed singer John Lennon in 
December 1980.216 Chapman considered other celebrities and a public official as a target 
before deciding on Lennon.217 
One of the most consistent findings among the various studies is that no matter 
which category the person falls into, targeted violence offenders have a high percentage of 
“leaking” or communicating their intentions to others. As shown in Table 1, the likelihood 
of this behavior is extremely high, as 92% of those studied in Preventing Assassination, 
and 81% of those studied in The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative 
communicated their intentions to commit an attack beforehand. The Bombing Alone study 
also showed that lone-actor terrorists had a significant communication of intent with 64% 
of those studied doing so before their attacks. Finally, the mass murders studied in Shooting 
Alone, while reporting the lowest number at 31% of those studied communicating intent, 
still reflects almost one third of the studies’ raw data.218 
Numerous examples of high-profile targeted violence events occurred before which 
the attackers directly informed a friend or family member of their intentions to act. Thus, 
understanding the subjects’ social network is all the more important to be able to identify 
the people with whom they have the most contact and thereby most likely to share 
important information.219 Examples of attacks that could have been prevented if people 
close to the subject had come forward include those of Timothy McVeigh and Mark 
Chapman.220 The case of Ted Kaczynski, often referred to as the “Unabomber,” who 
mailed bombs to targets from 1978 to 1995, was solved by his family.221 Kaczynski’s 
brother, who did not have prior knowledge of the attacks, recognized a manifesto published 
by the New York Times and Washington Post, at Kaczynski’s direction, as possibly being 
                                               
216 Fein and Vossekuil, 32. 
217 Fein and Vossekuil, 32. 
218 Gill et al., “Shooting Alone,” 712–713. 
219 Fein and Vossekuil, Preventing Assassination, 33–35. 
220 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist. 
221 David Kaczynski, “My Brother, The Unabomber,” Psychology Today 49, no. 1 (February 2016): 
68–76. 
48 
the work of his brother, who was living in a cabin in Montana and completely cut off from 
society.222 These cases highlight the fact that in threat assessment, one of the most 
important tools available to an investigator is communication with those closest to the 
subject. 
For investigators, it is essential to exploit the fact that suspects provide information 
to those close to them. The first step in that process is to identify those who are close 
enough to the subject to receive information that the person does not want shared with 
authorities. Next, the investigator must understand the conflict that a family member or 
friend will feel about sharing information that may be damaging to the subject. Borum 
states, “Those with kinship bonds may not approve at all of the attacker’s intent, but they 
may feel restrained from acting because of love and loyalty or concern about the 
consequences.”223 This idea was reflected in the words of David Kaczynski when he first 
read his brother Ted’s manifesto in the Washington Post, and wrestled with the idea that 
his brother could be the serial mail bomber popularly known as the Unabomber. He wrote:  
the conflict between our moral obligation and my love for Ted could not be 
reconciled. A decision could not be made without sacrificing one for the 
other. We wrestled with these questions by day and by nightfall felt even 
more confused and upset. If Ted was the Unabomber, it meant he was 
responsible for wanton, cruel attacks on innocent people, yet I couldn’t 
uncover any memories that revealed such deep-seated evil in him.224 
Taking into account the importance of shared information, threat assessment 
programs should carefully consider implementing better systems for people to report 
concerning behavior. These reporting systems should account for anonymity and ease of 
accessibility, and also provide multiple methods of reporting.225 It is important for the 
system to maintain continued credibility, which will be ensured if those who report feel 
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that they will be protected as confidential informants by investigators who appreciate that 
by coming forward, those informants may be jeopardizing their safety.226 
Mental health, which has been shown in the included studies to be an influencing 
condition in about half of the examined subjects, is not necessarily an overriding 
motivating factor, and does not attribute to a higher level of threat, despite popular 
belief.227 Hence, a large number of persons known to have mental illnesses were still 
capable of planning and executing complex coordinated attacks. An important task for 
investigators conducting a threat assessment on potentially mentally ill persons is to 
determine if they are capable of a level of organization that may allow them to conduct an 
attack.228 This determination is more relevant to ascertaining a potential threat than the 
diagnosis of any particular conditions the subjects may have. 
It is important for threat assessment investigators to learn not only from failures, 
but also from successes. Strom el al. conducted a study that examined 86 cases of terrorism 
plots from 1999–2009. They found 86 plots that caused, or were intended to cause 
casualties; of these cases, 18 plots were carried out, while 68 were stopped prior to 
successful execution.229 Of these cases, 35 were attributed to lone offenders, with a result 
of 10 executed plans, and 25 with intercession prior to the attacks.230 The study found that 
lone offenders were more successful in reaching execution, or 30% compared to 16% 
success by groups.231 
The study concluded that the 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies 
are not being used to their potential despite the fact that more that 80% of thwarted plots 
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were stopped by these groups and by the general public.232 The report found that 
approximately “one in five plots were foiled ‘accidentally’ during investigations into 
seemingly unrelated crimes.”233 This study recommends further training for local law 
enforcement to help them identify terrorism related activity when investigating other 
criminal acts and an increased amount of federal guidance for standardization for the 
collection and dissemination of suspicious activity at the local levels is advocated for as 
well.234 The study also found that nearly 40% of plots were prevented as a result of 
information derived from the general public, which highlights the importance of building 
trust between investigators and persons involved in radical movements.235 
Additional results of the study revealed that a key component for success in these 
cases was successfully handling the initial clue in the case.236 Conversely, mishandling the 
initial clue resulted in some significant failures.237 The study found mishandled initial 
clues that could have stopped seven of the 18 executed attacks, with four of the cases 
resulting in the initial clues not being fully investigated or forwarded to the correct 
agency.238 
One of these missed opportunities includes the attempted bombing of Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009. 
Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national, attempted to detonate explosives that he had hidden 
in his underwear while the flight was underway.239 He was subdued by a fellow passenger 
on the plane, and was unsuccessful in this attack, for which Al-Qaeda in Yemen took 
credit.240 The follow-up investigation found that Abdulmutallab’s father had reported to 
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U.S. State Department officials that his son held extremist views, had recently disappeared, 
and may have travelled to Yemen.241 This interview and the resulting intelligence was 
recorded with the National Counterterrorism Center, but was not added to the terrorist 
screening database due to incomplete information.242 
Another missed opportunity also occurred in 2009, involving Nidal Hasan, a U.S. 
Army Major, and psychiatrist, who killed 13 people and injured 30 additional at Fort Hood 
in Texas.243 The FBI was aware that Hasan had been exchanging emails with Anwar al-
Awlaki who was suspected of having strong ties to Al-Qaeda in Yemen, and that his 
colleagues were aware of his increasingly radical views.244 After screening the messages, 
the FBI decided that the emails were for a research paper that Hasan was writing and judged 
him not to be a threat.245 
Another incident in which the original clues were missed, with lethal consequences, 
involved the Columbine High School attack in Colorado in 1999. In 1998, an investigator 
with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office looked into a complaint against Eric Harris, one 
of the two eventual attackers of the high school, by a mother who said he threatened her 
son.246 The investigation revealed threats made on a website by Harris and included a 
description of pipe bomb, of which an actual device was found near his home.247 A search 
warrant for the home was drafted, but the department stated that it could not be completed 
due to a lack of probable cause, and the case was not furthered.248 
Since the completion of this study in 2009, at least three other high-profile cases in 
the United States have occurred in which eventual targeted violence actors were identified 
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as possible threats, but were either not investigated, or were investigated and deemed not 
to be a threat.  
3. Dimensional Classification 
Borum et al. suggested focusing the study of non-group targeted violence offenders 
in three categories: loneness, direction, and motivation.249 This method of classification 
and study may be more effective than the earlier listed studies on classes of assassins, mass 
murderers, lone terrorists, and school shooters. Studying offenders based on Borum’s three 
categories can potentially eliminate the missed comparisons of similar offenders based 
solely on target selection.250 The case of Anders Breivik is a good example; under the 
listed studies, he would have fallen into the category of a lone terrorist or lone wolf. 
However, Breivik intended to assassinate Jens Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, 
and altered his plans when Stoltenberg was not at the location that Breivik expected him to 
at the time of the attack.251 
Borum described measuring “loneness” as the extent to which the subject receives 
assistance in the initiation, planning, and execution of an attack.252 This category also 
measures the degree of contacts that the attacker has with those who assist, influence, 
inspire, or support the activity.253 Support was defined as either material or expressive, 
and referred to both social and emotional acts that created receptive conditions.254 Borum’s 
dimensional model placed those who received no outside assistance as solo offenders, and 
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those who received assistance from one or two other people in the initiation, planning, and 
preparation of the attack as lone offenders.255 
The second category of direction describes the subject’s independence in making 
decisions about the attack, from formulation of the idea to execution of the plan.256 This 
model takes into account the influences others played in the attacker’s plan, and the degree 
of influence they held over the subject. If the subjects did not receive personal guidance on 
target selection from a member of an extremist group, they would be classified as non-
directed. If the subjects did receive personal direction, the classification would be group 
directed.257 
The third category is an understanding of the subject’s motivation, and the degree 
to which the attack was driven by a “political, social, or ideologically based grievance, not 
solely by revenge or some other personal motive.”258 If the attack were motivated by 
revenge or a personal grievance, and not significantly motivated by political, social, or 
ideological factors, then the person would be classified as non-ideological. If the converse 
were the motivating factor, then the attack would be classified as ideological.259 
Targeted violence offenders mentioned throughout this study are classified under 
Borum’s dimensional classification parameters, included as follows.  
Timothy McVeigh would be considered a lone-non-directed-ideological attacker. 
This classification is derived from the fact that Terry Nichols and Mike Fortier assisted 
McVeigh in the planning and preparation of his attack.260 He is classified as non-directed, 
because while he was reported to have had contact with militant groups, no evidence has 
been found that they provided him with any instruction or guidance in target or weapons 
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selection.261 McVeigh was heavily motivated by his grievance against the ATF and federal 
government for their perceived attack on individual freedom and gun rights, which makes 
him an ideological attacker.262 
Anders Breivik would be considered a solo/non-directed/ideological attacker. The 
solo classification is derived from the fact that Breivik was not assisted in the planning and 
preparation of his attack.263 He is classified as non-directed, because although he stated 
that he was a member of the Norwegian Knights Templar group, Norwegian authorities 
found no evidence that this group actually existed.264 Breivik can be categorized as an 
ideological attacker, because in the 1,500-page manifesto that he left behind, 700 pages 
were devoted to attacking the Muslim religion.265 In fact, the title of the document 2083, 
relates to a 1683 battle in which European Christendom forces defeated the Ottoman 
Empire. He blamed the Norwegian government for allowing what he called the [sic] 
“Islamisation” of Europe.266 
James Holmes would be considered a solo/non-directed/non-ideological attacker. 
He acted without any assistance in carrying out or deciding on his target selection. He is 
classified as non-ideological attacker due to the writings in his notebook, in which he 
wrote, “Terrorism isn’t the message, the message is, there is no message.”267 Holmes also 
wrote that people would wrongly interpret his problems with relationships and jobs as the 
cause, stating that those reasons were catalysts, but not the reason.268 He offered his 
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motivation for the attack writing, “The causation being my state of mind for the past 15 
years.”269  
Tamerlan Tsarnaev would be considered a lone/non-directed/ideological attacker. 
He is considered lone because his brother assisted him in the attack.270 He is non-directed 
because even though he had contact with Chechen extremists, the target selection appears 
to be of his choosing.271 Tsarnaev is classified as ideological due to his following of 
Islamic extremists, and his desire to become a jihadist.272 
Classifying the study of non-group targeted violence offenders in the directional 
method, as suggested by Borum, allows for the further study of individuals who commit 
violent acts based on motivation instead of target selection.273 This method allows for 
comparative studies that may help future investigators better understand the minds of 
potential violent actors. In the aforementioned referenced targeted violence offenders, only 
McVeigh and Tsarnaev have similarities in all three of the suggested categories. The study 
of each category may prove valuable insight into the individual methods of radicalization 
and the pathways to violence. 
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III. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
A. SNA USE IN THREAT ASSESSMENT 
SNA has been used to understand how members of terrorist organizations are 
radicalized and motivated to commit violent acts. In a case study of two organizations, 
Ahmed Ressam’s Montreal Group and the Hamburg Group, SNA was used to map the 
progression of the individuals with the groups.274 Ressam was an Algerian born Al-Qaeda 
member who organized the failed Millennium Attack plot to bomb the Los Angeles Airport 
on New Year’s Eve in 1999.275 The Hamburg group was a small group of Muslim students 
who were members of a mosque in Germany, who later joined Al-Qaeda, and eventually, 
became three of the four pilots on September 11, 2001. The study explains how the use of 
SNA can mathematically map almost any form of relationship, depending on contact or the 
absence of contact, between nodes. Nodes are often described as representing individuals, 
but can be places, objects, or anything with an interconnected relationship. The 
relationships are shown as a visual graph, with centrality, or the level of connectivity as a 
key identification of the individual nodes in the network, and the flow of information 
between nodes. The article shows the radicalization process for both groups through the 
social connections that led them to join Al-Qaeda.276 The groups start from different 
places, Ressam from a criminal organization, and the Hamburg group from a religious 
background, but end up at the same place due to the influence of radicalized members of 
the established group. SNA, in this case, was able to map the group’s social isolation, 
increased in-group dependence, and out-group disassociation, which led to stronger bonds 
and coalition with like-minded members. One of the key repetitive factors is that both 
groups have no competing social memberships that would have restrained them from 
terrorism or provided a competing perspective. 
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In the 2018 study by Gill et al., it was found that 62% of lone actors held social ties 
with radical, extremists, or terrorist groups, which were influential during the formulation 
of motivation needed to carry out violent attacks.277 In some cases, these ties remained 
influential during the preparation phase of the attack. The study also found that 33% had 
social ties to the leaders of the extremist groups, and 31% were members of the groups at 
some point in time.278 
The study findings challenged a popular conception that lone actors operated in 
complete isolation with limited ways to detect them before they acted.279 It stands to reason 
that if lone actors are maintaining social ties, then those ties are important to building a 
complete threat assessment picture. Lone actors were frequently described as participating 
on the fringe of groups but were still heavily influenced by the identity and goals of the 
group, which could influence motivation against the out-group, and assist with overcoming 
moral barriers to commit acts of violence.280 Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols would 
be a relevant example of this finding, as they saw them themselves as part of the anti-
government movement but remained on the fringe of an actual organized group.281 The 
study also found that even when actors leave the group, they are still likely to emulate those 
they consider leaders because of their past willingness and ability to commit violent attacks 
successfully.282 Of all the lone actors examined in the study, 78% were encouraged to 
commit violent acts by the either online or by extremist leaders, and at a minimum, drew 
inspiration from the larger radical group that eventually led to emulation of those groups’ 
actions.283 
As a tool designed to further threat assessment investigations, SNA has the potential 
to provide invaluable insights into the subject. Knowing the social ties of the subject would 
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allow an investigator to question a subject about suspicious ties and analyze their meanings, 
especially if the subject were not truthful or forthcoming. A SNA program designed for 
use in threat assessment cases should identify not only the people in the threat subjects’ 
network, represented as ties, but tools, such as Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA),284 
should identify the strength of those ties.285 An investigator can use this information to 
recognize those ties most important and potentially influential in the subject’s life. This 
information can help direct the investigation in determining who to interview to obtain 
information about the subject, or decide what other people in the network may themselves 
need to be investigated to complete the picture.286 
Organizations that the subject may belong to should be identified and analyzed to 
see if they are potentially ties that may push or pull the subject towards or away from 
violent actions.287 Similarly, the subject’s online network can also be important in 
determining if ties are a potential positive or negative influence.288 A benefit of using a 
social network tool is that the information contained in the analysis can be stored, and after 
a period of time, compared to the subject’s current network to identify changes. This 
information can be useful if it shows that the subject has withdrawn from social contacts, 
as was the case of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Anders Breivik.289 Conversely, the information 
stored can also be useful if the subject’s social network has expanded to include more 
extremist or militant people or organizations. The information can also show that the 
person is moving away from extremist people or organizations, which can also help to 
shape the way that the investigator evaluates the person as a threat.290 
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B. SNA PROJECT CREATION 
The following information on how to create an SNA project is taken directly from 
the Common Operational Research Environment, CORE, Laboratory, located at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.291 
The project should begin with a clearly defined problem statement that 
defines the social system to be mapped and studied. The problem statement 
can be defined with the help of the following information: who is the group 
of interest, what is the goal of the investigation, when did the group form 
and become operational, where is the group operational and where is it 
unable to operate, and why is the group relevant. Potential objectives of 
SNA research include creating understanding, providing an explanation for 
an act, categorizing  the type of network, evaluating the impact of policy 
on the network, and predicting changes to the network if specific actions are 
taken.292 
After the problem has been defined, the next step in the process is to form 
a research question. Questions frequently used in this process include how 
do network partners affect individuals, how do the positions of individuals 
affect their outcome; how do individuals affect network structure, how did 
the network structure come into existence, was it random or as a result of a 
certain set of conditions, and does the network have a clear command-and-
control structure or not. More specific questions would address the network 
structure and its impact on resiliency, the flow of information, resources, 
and finances, the cohesiveness of subgroups within the network, and an 
identification of the most important or central actors in the network 
including brokers between groups, and those with access to information.293 
The next step is including assumptions based on the prior knowledge of the 
network and considering the following: the perceived results of studying the 
network, assumptions about the target population, and the expectation of 
how data input will shape the ultimate result.294 
The boundaries of the project form the next step in the research to include 
the determination of which actors are included in the investigation. 
Questions to be considered for this section encompass determining the 
direction of the investigation of an ego-network or entire group, defining 
                                               






the geographical boundaries of the network and period of time for 
examination, and reviewing any additional attributes of the focus network 
to narrow the scope to relevant members.295 
The next section involves identifying the actors and relationships important 
to the problem statement. In identifying the relevant ties, the following 
should be considered: the types of relationships that are relevant, 
communications ties, kinship ties, etc., the network distance between these 
ties, and whether the expected relationships can be defined and 
quantified.296 
While not the focus of an SNA research project, attributes can help enhance 
both  the visual and statistical analysis. Considerations for this category 
include deciding on the need for individual characteristics, such as age, sex, 
etc., and determining the benefit of adding the information.297 
Data sources encompass the inclusion of all sources of information to be 
included in the research. Questions include which data sources are to be 
used, covering human intelligence, or limiting the research to quantifiable 
information from an established records management system.298 
Challenges or limits to the research project are the final listed category in 
the creation of an SNA project. What are the restrictions in obtaining data, 
due to  classification or other reasons, is variable or not quantifiable 
information expected, and what are any foreseen barriers, such as 
organizational, legal, or cross-jurisdictional to be encountered.299 
C. COMPUTER DATABASE ALERTS USE IN THREAT ASSESSMENT 
As the United States increasingly moves to become a digital society, the uses of 
stored information are a potential for expediting processes that previously took much 
longer to accomplish. For example, the process for probation officers to receive 
information that one of the subjects that they supervised had been arrested could formally 
take weeks if not months to find out, and sometimes, the officers never found out due to 
how the arrest information was recorded and disseminated. Today, programs exist that will 







send these officers digital alerts when those they supervise come into contact with law 
enforcement. These alerts are methods that should be examined for use in threat 
assessment. As previously mentioned, and seen in cases, such as Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 
potential threats can be deceptive in their intentions, or continue to radicalize so that they 
then evolve into a threat after contact with law enforcement.300 It is important to create 
alerts within the threat assessment field to focus attention back on those subjects whose 
level of concern did not provide for continuous monitoring. 
Keeping privacy concerns in mind, these alerts should only be imposed upon those 
subjects deemed to be a potential threat; lawmakers would have the rights to impose 
limitations, such as requiring a judge to be presented with facts that the person does potentially 
pose a threat. Any regulation imposed on the process should involve the education of threat 
assessment investigations to all persons involved in the determination including judges. This 
system would be helped by having joint threat assessment teams, based on the United Kingdom 
system, which includes health care professionals. In this system, cases would benefit from the 
experience and education of having dedicated personnel. 
Systems that should be researched for possible inclusion into these alerts are 
criminal databases, which alert the threat case investigator if the subject is arrested or 
suspected of a crime. This alert can be expanded to include alerts following the arrest of 
subjects within the threat suspects’ social network, especially involving crimes of violence, 
theft of weapons, or explosive materials.  
Another database to be considered is the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System (NICS). Created following the passage of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993, the FBI created this database in 1998.301 Federal firearms 
licensees use the NICS to determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible to purchase a 
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firearm.302 If a suspected threat attempts to purchase a firearm, the NICS should deny the 
sale until the case investigators can determine the subject’s current threat level. This 
database would not be effective for purchases involving private sales, or illegally obtained 
firearms, but could potentially stop a threat from purchasing through a gun store. This alert 
would be the same currently in use with the FBI’s terrorism watch list.303 Senator Ron 
Johnson, chairman of a Senate homeland-security committee, in calling for a review of the 
FBI’s investigation of the Omar Mateen case, noted that if he had remained on the watch 
list, officials would have been notified of his gun purchase prior to the Pulse nightclub 
shooting.304 
Travel of potential threats should be monitored, and case investigators alerted, 
especially for cases similar to Tamerlan Tsarneav where the threat suspect travels to a country 
like Chechnya with a large militant radical population. Databases, such as the Transportation 
and Security Administration’s Secure Flight, can act as an alert system when threat suspects 
travel to watch listed countries, and more importantly, when they return.305 
The final category recommended for consideration is a mental health alert. An alert 
would be triggered if the suspected threat subject were committed or treated for a 
significant mental health issue. In understanding the need for laws that provide citizens 
protection against government intrusion into their medical history, it is also necessary to 
balance privacy with keeping people from harming themselves and others. The proposed 
United Kingdom styled model, which allows mental health professionals to work in 
conjunction with threat investigators, has the potential, if correctly regulated, to balance 
these two goals.306 It is also important to note that the goal of these investigations is, first 
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and foremost, to prevent an attack, which will likely be better served through additional 
help than through the criminal justice system.307 
An example of a case that could have benefitted from this proposed mental health 
alert was that of Virginia Tech college student Seung-Hui Cho. On April 16, 2007, Cho 
killed 32 students and faculty, and wounded another 17 before turning the gun on 
himself.308 Following the Columbine school shooting in April 1999, Cho wrote a school 
paper that referenced his ideas of suicide and indicated that he wished to repeat 
Columbine.309 In December 2005, following repeated incidents of stalking type behavior 
with different female students and a suicide threat, police had Cho hospitalized 
involuntarily. The hospital determined that he was an imminent danger to himself and 
others.310 After he was discharged by the hospital, Cho was judged by a special justice to 
be “an imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness,” and ordered Cho to attend 
outpatient treatment.311 Cho ignored the order and continued to have concerning mental 
health problems, including a social withdrawal and homicidal themes in his schoolwork.312 
Cho’s preparation for the attack began with gun purchases 14 months after being found by 
the hospital and court to be dangerous to himself and others, with no follow-up contact on 
his progress.313  
Cho’s case shows the importance of cooperation between the courts, mental health 
workers, and law enforcement in preventing future similar cases from having the same 
result. It is easy without the cooperation of mental health workers to consider this case a 
law enforcement problem, and vice versa, and unless a vehicle is available to them to work 
together, some attackers will fall through the cracks. A system of notifications and alerts 
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should be implemented between courts, hospitals, and law enforcement to ensure that each 
is made aware when subjects deemed dangerous are released unconfined. 
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IV. ANALYSIS—CASE STUDIES 
A. TARGETED VIOLENCE CASE STUDIES 
In examining these cases, it should be noted that this paper is not an attempt to 
second guess an investigation or methods used, or possible clues missed. It is very easy to 
fill in facts once the answers are known and then assume that it may have been done better. 
This research has the opposite purpose and acknowledges that this process is extremely 
difficult. Overall, the objective is to learn and improve, not second guess.  
1. Timothy McVeigh 
On April 19, 1995, Timothy J. McVeigh detonated a 7,000-pound truck bomb in 
front of Oklahoma City’s Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building that killed 168 people, 19 of 
whom were children.314 McVeigh was a former U.S. Army veteran who developed a deep 
grievance against the U.S. government and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, 
for what he perceived to be the unlawful erosion of individual freedoms and Second 
Amendment gun rights.315 
McVeigh was not diagnosed with a mental disease prior to arrest and had not 
suffered the loss of a loved one or any other typical mental stress indicator.316 McVeigh’s 
social ties shared his views of the government that would have strengthened his extremist 
ideology. McVeigh has been the frequent subject of analysis because he, unlike many lone 
attackers, survived his attack and gave extensive interviews about himself and his 
motivations.  
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a. Threat Assessment of Timothy McVeigh  
(1) “What motivated the subject to make the statement or take the action that 
caused him or her to come to attention?” 317 
McVeigh was deeply concerned with gun rights and following the passage of the 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban, he made the decision to commit an attack against the U.S. 
government.318 Following the standoff in Waco, Texas between the Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF), FBI, and Branch Davidians, McVeigh traveled to Waco. 
While in Waco, he was interviewed by a reporter from a student newspaper stating, “I 
believe we are slowly turning into a socialist government. The government is continually 
growing bigger and more powerful, and the people need to prepare themselves against 
government control.”319 
On February 11, 1992, he sent a letter to the local newspaper and his congressman 
and ended the letters with his signature.320 The letter was about the high rates of crime, 
high taxes, overpaid politicians, and a healthcare system that was unfair to the poor. In the 
letter, he wrote, “Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I hope that it 
doesn’t come to that, but it might.”321 
(2) “What, if anything, has the subject communicated to someone else (target, 
law enforcement, family, friends, colleagues, associates) or written in a 
diary or journal concerning his or her intentions?” 322 
In July 1994, McVeigh wrote a letter to a former friend Steve Hodge and expressed 
his anger at the federal government over Waco and government efforts to limit personal 
freedoms. “Those who betray or subvert the constitution are guilty of sedition and/or 
treason, are domestic enemies and should and will be punished accordingly.”323 He went 
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on to write, “I have come to peace with myself, my God and my cause. Blood will flow in 
the streets, Steve. Good vs. evil. Free Men vs. Socialist Wannabe Slaves. Pray it is not your 
blood, my friend.”324 
In September 1994, the assault weapons ban became law. In the same month, 
McVeigh wrote to his friend Mike Fortier about his plan to take offensive action against 
the government and asked for help.325 Two weeks later, McVeigh met with Fortier and 
asked him to help blow up a federal building. McVeigh later told Fortier and his wife that 
he would make a truck bomb and detonate it at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, the anniversary of Waco.326 
McVeigh’s father repeatedly heard him make anti-government comments, 
including comments against the president by saying, “someone should kill the son of a 
bitch,” but did not consider it a real threat, even though he acknowledged that he noticed 
his son’s hatred for government continually intensifying.327 
In November 1994, he told his sister Jennifer that he was moving to the action phase 
against the government. He did not give her specifics, but he had her help him write a letter 
to an American Legion post saying that militia groups had the right to react with violence 
when government agents drew first blood.328 
(3) “Has the subject shown an interest in any of the following? Assassins or 
assassinations; weapons; militant or radical ideas/groups; murders, 
murderers, mass murderers, and workplace violence and stalking 
incidents.” 329 
Following his senior year in high school, McVeigh read The Turner Diaries and 
began to circulate the book amongst his friends. The book was written by former American 
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Nazi Party official William Pierce, about a gun rights enthusiast who reacts to gun control 
by destroying FBI headquarters in Washington, DC with a truck bomb. The book is 
sympathetic to Adolph Hitler, and advocates killing African Americans and Jews.330 He 
gave the book to other soldiers while in the Army, and later sold it at gun shows.331 
In 1991, he paid $20 for trial membership to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), although he 
did not renew when the first year was up, and later stated that he thought the KKK stood 
for individual freedom and gun rights.332 McVeigh stated that he did not renew the 
membership because the group was more interested in racism than individual freedom and 
was not in line with his way of thinking.333 
(4) “Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, harassing, 
and/or stalking-type behaviors? These behaviors combine an inappropriate 
interest with any of the following: developing an attack idea or plan; 
approaching, visiting, and/or following the target; approaching, visiting, 
and/or following the target with a weapon; attempting to circumvent 
security; assaulting or attempting to assault a target.” 334 
McVeigh scouted federal buildings for potential targets. He also recruited Fortier, 
who scouted federal buildings in Phoenix, and Nichols, who checked the federal building 
in Kansas City, Missouri.335 In December 1994, McVeigh scouted a federal building in 
Little Rock Arkansas before deciding on Oklahoma City as his target. In December 1994, 
McVeigh, accompanied by Fortier, surveilled the Murrah building, and on April 12, 1995, 
McVeigh made his final preparatory survey of the Murrah building in Oklahoma City.336 
In 1994, McVeigh, with help from Terry Nichols, rented a storage locker in 
Arizona, and began to steal explosives from a quarry in Kansas.337 In September and 
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October of the same year, McVeigh and Terry Nichols purchased thousands of pounds of 
ammonium nitrate using the alias Mike Havens. They conducted a small test of the 
explosive in the dessert outside Fortier’s home.338 
(5) “Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command 
hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution etc., with 
indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs?” 339 
McVeigh did not have a history of mental illness; however, he did feel that the U.S. 
government was persecuting him over his Second Amendment rights. 
(6) “How organized is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to plan and 
execute a violent action against a target?” 340 
McVeigh was very organized, and with his military training, clearly had the ability 
to plan and execute violent actions. 
(7) “Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing desperation and/or 
despair? Has the subject experienced a recent personal loss and/or loss of 
status? Is the subject now, or has the subject ever been suicidal?” 341 
McVeigh had trouble throughout his life with job-related satisfaction; outside of 
his time in the Army, he felt as though he spent an exhaustive amount of time in numerous 
menial jobs that did not utilize his skills.342 He did have suicidal feelings after developing 
a gambling problem and losing more money than he could afford. His failure to obtain 
satisfactory employment led him frequently to live with friends, which gave him the feeling 
that he did not have a home. He was never able to establish a relationship with a woman, 
and he felt as though he had post-traumatic stress disorder after his time in the Army, 
although he was never officially diagnosed.343 McVeigh’s only personal loss was his 
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grandfather, with whom he was close, but not likely a motivating reason for his actions. 
Following his separation from the Army, he never again held a job that would provide him 
the same status and security.344 
(8) “Is the subject’s story consistent with his or her actions?” 345 
Law enforcement officers did not interview McVeigh prior to his attack, so he did 
not have a story to tell. 
(9) “Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might act based 
on inappropriate ideas?” 346 
McVeigh conveyed his anti-government ideas to those closest to him, but those 
who knew of his ideas were like-minded in their dislike of the government and would not 
have approached law enforcement with concerns of his potential actions. 
(10) “What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase or 
decrease the likelihood that the subject will attempt to attack a target or 
targets?” 347 
Due to McVeigh’s social isolation, he was very unlikely to come into contact with, 
or listen to, anyone who had differing opinions on gun control and government issues. His 
environment of working at gun shows and tendency only to socialize with people who 
shared his views acted as an echo chamber to reinforce his beliefs.348 His social identity 
was that of the person who would stand up to government oppression, which he felt was 
causing America to become an over-taxed police state; in his view, he was fighting for 
freedom.349 
                                               
344 Michel and Herbeck, 95–117. 
345 Fein and Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, 50. 
346 Fein and Vossekuil, 50. 
347 Fein and Vossekuil, 50. 
348 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist, 117–159. 
349 Michel and Herbeck, 117–159. 
73 
b. Timothy McVeigh Threat Assessment Conclusion 
The totality of McVeigh’s life certainly paints a picture of a person who becomes 
increasingly anti-government and escalates his threats up until September 1994, when he 
shifts from just expressing anti-government views to planning a violent attack actively. The 
timing of entering into the planning phase corresponds to the passage of the assault 
weapons ban. His first action was to tell his close friends about his plan and enlist their 
help. His second action occurred in October when he purchased a storage locker and placed 
explosives stolen from a quarry in Kansas inside the locker. McVeigh never came to the 
attention of law enforcement, so any possible investigation or threat assessment is 
hypothetical. If someone close to McVeigh had reported him, however as a potential threat 
before September 1994, an investigator would likely have concluded that McVeigh held 
deep anti-governmental views on gun control laws, but might not have concluded that he 
was a threat based on the numbers of other people who also shared anti-government views 
who never committed violent actions.  
Between September 1994 and April 1995, when the attack occurred, if McVeigh 
had come to the attention of law enforcement, the discovery of the attack planning 
activities, combined with McVeigh’s anti-government views and personal history, could 
have led investigators to determine his intent and intervene before he completed his attack. 
However, what this model does not fully account for is the tracking of others within 
McVeigh’s social network for clues to use to assess the potential threat fully. For example, 
if McVeigh came to attention of law enforcement for his anti-government comments, and 
an investigator felt a threat assessment was warranted, but did not yet rise to the level of 
being able to bring criminal actions, said investigator would potentially benefit from 
finding out about Terry Nichols or Mike Fortier committing overt acts to accomplish 
McVeigh’s plan.  
In short, when dealing with investigations that offer very few clues, and limited 
windows in which to detect actions that can lead to devastating results, having every piece 
of information possible is critical. While not a new idea, the tools used to piece together 
these types of clues have previously been very limited, and regulated to written reports, or 
individual electronic case reports. 
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c. SNA Enhancement 
Question number 10 in this threat assessment, regarding “factors in the subject’s 
life and/or environment that might increase or decrease the likelihood that the subject will 
attempt an attack,” would be the element most closely tied to social network formulas.350 
As previously stated, the vast majority of subjects from the exceptional case study 
exhibited change over time before finally reaching the planning and execution phase of 
their attacks. In this regard, Timothy McVeigh was no different; prior to September 1994, 
he held anti-government views regarding gun control issues shared by thousands of other 
people.  
In McVeigh’s case, once he separated from the Army, his social network never 
included many individuals who held differing views from his regarding gun control. 
However, as he continued to become more radicalized, his social ties shrank to only those 
whose views were strongly anti-government. Case in point, the National Rifle Association, 
a group known as a fervent detractor of the government and gun regulation, was a group 
that McVeigh felt was too soft on gun rights, which caused him to cancel his membership 
in 1994.351 Additionally, McVeigh was reported to have ties to both the Michigan Militia 
and Arizona Patriots; understanding why he was drawn to these groups and ultimately why 
he may have left the groups would be important information in assessing his movement 
towards or away from potential violence.352 
d. Social Network Mapping of Timothy McVeigh 
Based on the previously mentioned section on creating an SNA research project 
using guidelines from the CORE laboratory, the following information is used for an SNA 
examination of Timothy McVeigh. The goal of the research is to ascertain if using an SNA 
map of McVeigh’s social network can provide information to an investigator conducting a 
threat assessment relevant enough to inform a decision. The data for McVeigh’s network 
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was obtained from open source material, most notably the book American Terrorist.353 
The data is separated into two time periods in McVeigh’s life, and the SNA maps are 
created for both periods as an ego analysis, as well as an extended analysis to examine the 
ties held by his network. The visualizations are a two-mode network and map both people 
and organizations. This project is limited because the subject of the examination is already 
known to have committed a violent act and is intended to provide a starting point for 
possible future research in the field of threat assessment. 
Using the information gathered on McVeigh’s social ties allows for the creation of 
a visual network of his life. The network has been broken up into two different time periods. 
The first, described as pre-radicalization is from 1987, just after his high school graduation, 
until February 28, 1993, the day of the ATF raid in Waco Texas, shown in Figure 1. The 
post-radicalization time period starts on February 28, 1993 and culminates on April 19, 
1995 with the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, shown 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1. Ego Network—Pre-Radicalization, 1987–2/28/1993 (ORA 
v2.3.6) 
 
Figure 2. Ego Network—Post-Radicalization, 2/28/1993–4/19/1995 
(ORA v2.3.6) 
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In examining the two social network maps of McVeigh, an investigator could 
reasonably conclude that in the post-radicalization period, he had far fewer contacts with 
persons holding pro-government views, and that his contacts were more isolated and more 
likely to echo his radical beliefs. It would be important to note that in his post-radicalization 
period, he still had a social network and did not fall into a withdrawn “lone” category, such 
as that of a Theodore Kaczynski. However, he clearly did withdraw from numerous people 
who held opinions not in line with his. As a tool, the social network mapping clearly shows 
the size of the subject’s network, and more clearly defines those individuals important in 
that network. This definition is more clearly defined in Figure 3, in which the subjects of 
McVeigh’s social network are then connected to their own social network using degree 
centrality. This visualization shows the persons connected to McVeigh, namely Terry 
Nichols, who have concerning contacts, and allows for the streamlining of leads concerning 
people who an investigator may focus on during an investigation.  
The further definition of McVeigh’s network shown in Figures 3 and 4 clearly 
illuminates those contacts’ ties within the different groups that make up McVeigh’s 
associations. This connection is further highlighted in Figure 4, which shows that the 
person having the most prior knowledge of McVeigh’s attack, Terry Nichols, has the most 








Figure 4. Extended Network—Post-Radicalization, 2/28/1993–
4/19/1995 (ORA V2.3.6) 
Using the mapping in conjunction with SIT, it can be seen that McVeigh’s 
departure from the U.S. Army may have also greatly impacted his radicalization 
process.354 Brannan explains, “the experience of belonging to a group determines the 
identities of most individuals in a powerful way. When we join or leave groups that are 
important to us, we redefine who we are.”355 In interviews, McVeigh stated that the Army 
was an important part of his life, and certainly affected the framework of his self-
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identity.356 While he mistrusted the government over gun rights ideology, prior, during, 
and after his military time, the intensity of his mistrust deepened following his separation 
from service, which suggests a contribution to the change in his identity from a soldier to 
a self-described defender of the Second Amendment and personal freedom.357 As a 
member of the U.S. Army, he might have disagreed with gun laws, but it seems far less 
likely that he would have resorted to violence while he identified as being a soldier. 
However, his separation from the military took away that restraint, and changed his in-
group to the patriot movement, and made his out-group focus the U.S. government.  
This tool would be most effective as a picture of differing moments in time. For 
example, if for McVeigh, his social network each year could be mapped, the resulting 
picture of further social isolation could lead an investigator to conclude that he was moving 
towards radicalization and lead to further investigation. The results of SNA mapping on a 
potential threat could yield numerous results, with one being a determination of whether, 
like McVeigh, subjects were shrinking their network and only engaging with people, 
groups, or institutions that would lead the subjects further towards radicalization. SNA also 
allows for the mapping of online network connections, which has increasingly become the 
primary radicalization medium.358 
Another result would show that a person’s social network was expanding, and 
within that expansion, the subject might be contacting more people who could be 
considered a negative contact with the result of further influencing the individual towards 
radicalization. Conversely, the person’s expanding network might show that they were 
coming into contact with positive influences that might push the subject away from 
violence. Often times, persons who move from grievance to a pathway of violence are 
isolated and unhappy, but the mere change in becoming involved in a relationship may 
have the effect of making the grievance less personally significant. 
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The extreme difficulty in these cases is determining the difference in McVeigh 
versus all the others who have held similar views but never committed an act of violence. 
A potential answer lies in having investigators trained and experienced in working these 
types of cases, and continuously monitoring the subject with the clearest picture available. 
Examining a person’s social network may provide clues to a person’s mental health and 
help determine if that person is moving towards or away from a path of violence.  
e. Operational Vulnerabilities 
One possible way to expand threat assessment is to identify where potential 
attackers are vulnerable in the planning and execution of their attacks, and to learn from 
these potential vulnerabilities and develop strategies that address future investigative 
opportunities. In McVeigh’s case, the biggest vulnerability of being caught prior to his 
attack rested in the information about the attack that he leaked to those within his social 
network.  
McVeigh informed three people of his intentions to detonate a bomb at a federal 
building. Terry Nichols, Mark Fortier, and Lori Fortier all knew of his intentions prior to 
the attack and any one of them could have alerted authorities and averted the bombing. 
McVeigh knew that telling people would have left him vulnerable to detection before he 
had a chance to carry out his plan, so his selection of these three people would be based on 
their being like-minded individuals, who shared his ideals, and who would not inform 
anyone else, especially law enforcement, about his plans. For law enforcement, finding the 
right people to interview to obtain relevant information about the subject of the 
investigation is critical to its success. As stated earlier in this report, incidents of subjects 
providing information to those they trust prior to an attack are consistently prevalent in 
directed attacks. The use of SNA to identify more efficiently those persons, who are likely 
to be close enough to the subject to be trusted enough to receive important information, is 
of the utmost importance.  
Typically, family members are considered good sources of information, but as 
McVeigh’s case highlights, should not be relied upon too heavily. Of McVeigh’s family 
members, only his sister Jennifer would have had an indication that he was possibly 
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planning an attack, and she would not have been able to provide specific information.359 
McVeigh was not especially close to the members of his family except for his grandfather 
who McVeigh described as the only person he ever really cared about, when 
interviewed.360 McVeigh wanted his grandfather’s approval, so he likely would not have 
told him about his plans, and therefore, he would not have been a good source for accurate 
information. His grandfather’s death in October 1994 may have removed the last of the 
social constraints on McVeigh that had previously prevented him from action, because he 
would no longer have to deal with his grandfather’s disappointment in him following the 
attack.361 
The SNA visual maps show that McVeigh’s ties to the people who made him 
vulnerable to discovery prior to his attack were close to him, had been close to him in both 
the pre- and post-radicalization period, and closely shared the same beliefs and 
organizational ties.  
2. Anders Behring Breivik 
On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik initiated an attack culminating years of 
planning with the detonation of a vehicle laden with explosives next to a government 
building in downtown Oslo, Norway.362 The resulting explosion killed eight people and 
injured nine others. Breivik then traveled directly to the small island of Utøya, posed as a 
police officer to access the ferry, and opened fire on a youth summer camp for the 
Norwegian Labor Party.363 Breivik killed 69 additional people on the island and convinced 
some of those victims to come out of hiding by telling them that he was a policeman, only 
to shoot them when they complied.364 After 70 minutes of terror, he surrendered to 
Norwegian authorities. During his initial interview with authorities, Breivik stated that he 
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was the “commander of the Knights Templars Norway,” and that the people on the island 
were considered “category C traitors.”365 
Following his arrest, Breivik was the subject of two forensic evaluations. The first 
evaluation resulted in a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, which, being a psychotic 
disorder, would have made him legally unaccountable for his actions under Norwegian 
law.366 The second diagnosis was that of severe narcissistic personality disorder with a 
compulsion towards pathological lying; this diagnosis would have made him legally 
accountable under Norwegian law.367 The resulting criminal trial found in favor of the 
personality disorder evaluation and Breivik was sentenced to the maximum allowable 
sentence of 21 years in prison.368 
During his trial, Breivik provided reasons for his attack, which included a wish to 
direct attention to the cause and distribution of his compendium, and to make those who 
promoted multiculturalism in Norway accountable.369 
a. Threat Assessment of Anders Behring Breivik 
(1) “What motivated the subject to make the statement or take the action that 
caused him or her to come to attention?” 370 
Breivik did not make any statements that brought him to the attention of Norwegian 
law enforcement prior to his attack, but in March 2011, he was added to a watch list 
following the purchase of a large amount of fertilizer from an online store in Poland.371 
Police later determined that he had purchased the fertilizer for a farm that he rented and 
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removed him from the watch list without further investigation.372 Breivik obtained the 
farm for disguising the fertilizer purchase from police. After examining Breivik, the 
Norwegian Security Service determined that he was not a threat, as he did not make violent 
statements in online chats, was not a member of an extremist group, registered his guns, 
did not show signs of being a terrorist, and lacked any criminal record.373 
(2) “What, if anything, has the subject communicated to someone else (target, 
law enforcement, family, friends, colleagues, associates) or written in a 
diary or journal concerning his or her intentions?” 374 
Breivik intentionally distanced himself from his friends to resist the urge to tell 
them about his plans. He was extremely successful in maintaining operational secrecy, to 
the extent that no one had any idea of what he was planning.375 He also stated in his 
interview that telling his friends would have been a violation of his oath as a Templar 
Knight.376 Starting in 2002, Breivik wrote about his plans and ideas, and from 2006 to 
2009, he included specific targeting information in the document that he released through 
Facebook on the day of the attack.377 
Breivik’s writings included complex planning for all phases of his eventual attack, 
including how to set up a vehicle bomb, which he detonated in the government district of 
Oslo.378 His manifesto also detailed instructions on wearing a police uniform, which he 
did to gain access to the island of Utøya where he conducted his second attack.379 Breivik 
wrote, “the police illusion will also act as a deterrent towards preventing potential civilian 
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charges.”380 On the island, he was able to convince people to come out of hiding because 
he was a police officer, only to shoot them when they emerged.381  
In his writing, Breivik also references plans to assassinate the Prime Minister, Jens 
Stoltenberg, as Stoltenberg visits Utøya every summer as part of the political party’s youth 
camp.382 Political assassination was Breivik’s original target for the island of Utøya; he 
hoped to behead three top Norwegian politicians who were visiting the camp that day. 
However, when he arrived at the island to conduct his attack, they were not there, and he 
chose to proceed without his original targets present.383 
(3) “Has the subject shown an interest in any of the following? Assassins or 
assassinations; weapons; militant or radical ideas/groups; murders, 
murderers, mass murderers, and workplace violence and stalking 
incidents.” 384 
Breivik did extensive research on all the aforementioned categories, wrote about 
ways to commit assassinations, and went to great lengths to hide his research.385 In his 
manifesto, he wrote: 
for assassinations or for intelligence gathering prior to a mission. 
[sic]Infiltration of enemy organizations might prove an easy way to get 
close to otherwise impossible targets (prime minister or ministers) or to 
learn their [sic]programme. Getting a job at the youth camp connected to 
the largest political party is one way of doing this. The prime minister 
usually visits during summer season. Infiltration can take as long as 24 
months.386 
Breivik wrote about those he classified as traitors, “Category A traitors are usually 
any current Heads of State, ministers/senators, directors and leaders of certain 
[sic]organisations/boards etc., who are guilty of charges 1–8. Category A traitors consist 
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of the most influential and highest profile traitors.”387 “Category B traitors” were defined 
as “cultural Marxist and multiculturalist politicians, primarily from the alliance of 
European political parties, and parliamentarians.”388 He also classified these: 
traitors as individuals from various professional groups including (but not 
limited to): journalists, editors, teachers, lecturers, university professors, 
various school/university board members, publicists, radio commentators, 
writers of fiction, cartoonists, and artists/celebrities. They could also be 
individuals from other professional groups such as: technicians, scientists, 
doctors and even religious leaders.389  
Breivik further defined his intentions, writing: 
we know who you are, where you live and we are coming for you. If not 
today, then tomorrow, if not in 10 years, then in 50 years. We are in the 
process of flagging every single multiculturalist traitor in Western Europe. 
You will be punished for your treasonous acts against Europe, and 
Europeans. We will ensure that all category A and B traitors, the enablers 
of [sic]Islamisation and the destroyers of our cultures, nations and societies, 
will be executed and your property expropriated. No mercy will be shown 
for category A, B and C traitors. The punishment for high treason is the 
same whether you are a hardcore Marxist, cultural Marxist, suicidal 
humanist, career [sic]cynicist or a capitalist globalist.390 
(4) “Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, harassing, 
and/or stalking-type behaviors? These behaviors combine an inappropriate 
interest with any of the following: Developing an attack idea or plan; 
approaching, visiting, and/or following the target; approaching, visiting, 
and/or following the target with a weapon; attempting to circumvent 
security; assaulting or attempting to assault a target.” 391 
In this case, Norwegian authorities had no prior evidence that Breivik was planning 
his attack. However, from 2002 to 2009, he was planning and recording his ideas in his 
journal, which he published online on the day of the attack. He discussed the planning 
phase and wrote, “gain as much knowledge of the terrain as possible: know every street. 
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Be prepared in case anything goes wrong. What will you do if a vehicle breaks down, what 
will you do if you get injured or flanked?”392 
(5) “Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command 
hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution etc., with 
indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs?” 393 
At a young age, the Child Psychiatric Services examined Breivik, after his mother 
complained that he was an extremely difficult child.394 His parents divorced when he was 
one-year old, and Breivik was raised by his mother.395 His home situation during this 
period was disruptive enough for the examiner to recommend that Breivik be placed in 
foster care to protect against what he termed “developing psychopathology.”396 The final 
recommendation from Child Welfare Services determined that he should remain in his 
home and the case was closed a year later.397 Breivik did not undergo any additional 
psychological evaluations prior to his attack; however, his mother testified during his trial 
that from the time that he moved back in with her in 2006, he acted erratically, and was 
obsessed with politics and history.398 In the year leading up to the attack, he began to wear 
an antiseptic face mask in the house for fear that she would infect him.399 At one point, 
Breivik even made an appointment with a doctor because he believed that his mother had 
infected his sinuses; however, he ultimately failed to show up for the appointment.400 
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During the psychological evaluation following the attack, the examiners found “no 
outward signs of depression, mania, auditory hallucinations or ideas of reference, influence 
phenomena or ideas of thought insertion.”401 Two evaluations were completed, in which 
both examiners concluded that Breivik had pathological self-aggrandizement. In the first 
evaluation, they found the “presence of bizarre grandiose delusions” and concluded that he 
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.402 
(6) “How organized is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to plan and 
execute a violent action against a target?” 403 
Breivik was extremely organized and spent at least nine years planning every detail 
of his operation. An example of his planning was detailed in his writings, which he 
categorized into a research phase, logistical phase, assembly phase, and 
implementation/execution of operation. Breivik also had security measures built into each 
phase of the operation. For security of the research phase, Breivik wrote:  
before you start the logistics phase you need to store all relevant 
research/information on a memory stick and get rid of it (bury it in a moist 
proof sealed container far away from your home, you will acquire it again 
in phase 3). The reason is that any written plans combined with weapons or 
explosives are considered solid evidence. Also, you need to replace (get rid 
of or destroy) your physical PC hard drive. Deleting the information is not 
sufficient. You need physically destroy it, submerge it in liquid and dump 
it on the other side of town.404  
For operational security of the logistics phase, he instructs, “acquire the necessary 
weapons, ammo, body armor and explosives.”405 He described the “shopping phase” as 
lasting up to 12 months, so he advised dividing the purchases and sealing “it in a container 
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and bury far from your home/base.”406 He further stated, the “essence is to avoid having 
weapons/[sic]armour (evidence) in your base/home as it will incriminate you.”407 
In addressing the assembly phase Breivik wrote, “This is the most risky phase. You 
are vulnerable as you will have all the equipment (evidence) you have acquired readily 
available. Ensure that the assembly phase does not last longer than it should (7 days 
maximum).”408 
Breivik created a checklist for every aspect of research acquisition and 
implementation of his plan, even going as far as to plan for unexpected problems, writing, 
“plan for emergency procedures such as vehicle breakdown, injury etc. Allow plenty of 
time when estimating the rate of progress. Pressure to keep to an over-ambitious schedule 
leads to exhaustion and errors of judgement.”409 
Breivik also planned his drug consumption to ensure that he was at his peak 
physical performance level and stated that for the attack, he should “be in the middle of a 
steroid cycle and take an ECA stack capsule 20 minutes prior to the initiation of the mission 
(ephedrine, caffeine, aspirin stack) which increases our strength and agility by 50–100% 
for 2 hours.”410  
(7) “Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing desperation and/or 
despair? Has the subject experienced a recent personal loss and/or loss of 
status? Is the subject now, or has the subject ever been suicidal?”411 
In 2006, Breivik was forced to move back into his mother’s house, after declaring 
financial bankruptcy. According to his friends, his behavior changed from this time 
onward. His friends stated that he became increasingly withdrawn, cut contact with them, 
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and was playing the video game World of Warcraft online for a large portion of his day.412 
His friends also worried that he might have an addiction to gambling. No evidence shows 
that Breivik was ever suicidal, and the mental evaluation following his arrest found no 
evidence of depression or despair.413 
However, according to Breivik’s writings, all the changes noticed by his friends 
were part of his operation security measures. He wrote that in an effort to justify his 
isolation and travel while in the planning phase, “tell them that you have started to play 
World of Warcraft or any other online MMO game and that you wish to focus on this for 
the next months/year. This ‘new project’ can justify isolation and people will understand 
somewhat why you are not answering your phone over long periods.”414 
He also saw the game as a useful cover, which enabled him to manipulate his friends 
unknowingly to help conceal his true intentions. Breivik described video game addiction 
as shameful in common society, and by claiming to be hooked on video game playing, he 
had an inconspicuous reason to ask friends to keep his secret. Breivik described this 
deception writing, “by revealing this secret to your close ones you are therefore (to them 
at least) entrusting them with your innermost secret.”415 He saw this deception as providing 
further cover from investigation by having people within his social circle provide an 
unknowing alibi and keeps his true intentions a secret.416 
(8) “Is the subject’s story consistent with his or her actions?”417 
Law enforcement officers did not interview Breivik prior to his attack, so he did 
not have a story to tell. 
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(9) “Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might act based 
on inappropriate ideas?”418 
Breivik’s mother stated in an interview following his arrest that starting in 2005 
when he moved back to her house, he had exhibited strange behavior, and became 
obsessive over politics and history.419 She described his political rants as “totally beyond 
reason” and that he believed “all the nonsense he said.”420 She also stated that he was still 
living at home by April 2011 and “had started acting in an even stranger manner, wearing 
an antiseptic mask around the house, refusing to eat food she had cooked for him, and 
calling the family doctor accusing her of infecting him with some illness.”421 While his 
mother clearly suspected that he was having mental health issues, she did not suspect that 
he had violent intentions. Likewise, his friends stated that the period when he moved back 
into his mother’s house coincided with his company going bankrupt. They describe him as 
depressed from that point on and never really being the same person. According to Breivik, 
the bankruptcy was not a significant event in his life. Like the situation with his mother, 
his friends were concerned about him, but did not suspect that he would become violent. 
(10) “What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might increase or 
decrease the likelihood that the subject will attempt to attack a target or 
targets?”422 
Breivik stated that prior to writing his manifesto, he realized that immigration, 
especially by Muslims, would result in Europeans becoming a minority. He believed that 
democratic attempts would not work to prevent a “Muslim takeover of Europe,” and he 
ultimately decided on an armed resistance.423 A change in Norway’s political or 
immigration status would likely have been the only outside influence that could have 
possibly affected Breivik’s grievance, and potentially changed the outcome.  
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b. Anders Breivik Threat Assessment Conclusion 
Anders Breivik developed a grievance against the Norwegian Labor Party for its 
open immigration policy, and acceptance of Muslims. This grievance may have started 
early in his life, as he mentioned witnessing ethnic Norwegians being the victims of 
violence at the hands of Muslim immigrants.424 According to his writings, he was the 
victim of attacks by Muslim youths on nine separate occasions, and also made reference to 
an ethnic Norwegian girl who was gang raped by immigrant boys from Pakistan.425 
However, Norwegian authorities have deemed much of what he wrote in his manifesto to 
be fabrications.426 Breivik’s first attempt to address his grievance was to join the anti-
immigration Progress Party. When he decided that democratic avenues were not an 
effective method by which to accomplish his goals, he moved to the path of violence. He 
claimed to be a defender of “European identity that is being overwhelmed by Muslim 
masses.”427 Breivik claimed that the NATO war on Serbia was the “tipping point” for his 
ideological direction and was later inspired by a meeting with a Serbian national in Liberia 
in 2002. Around this period, he claims to have become a member of two secret 
organizations, the Armed European Resistance Movement, and the PCCTS Knights 
Templar, formed to fight the takeover of Europe by Muslims. Breivik claimed these 
organizations met to plan attacks, although Norwegian authorities were never able to verify 
the existence of the groups.428 
He began writing a manifesto of his ideas, which he described as a “compendium” 
as early as 2002, titled 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, penned under the 
name of Andrew Berwick, in which he includes specific targets and attack planning 
information.429 Breivik wrote, “I’ve spent a total of 9 years of my life working on this 
project. The first five years were spent studying and creating a financial base, and the last 
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three years was spent working full time with research, compilation and writing. Creating 
this compendium has personally cost me a total of 317 000 Euros.”430 
Following the completion of his writing in 2009, he began the operational planning 
phase of his attack that included registering the agricultural company Breivik Geofarm in 
May 2009, which allowed him to purchase fertilizer and chemicals used in explosives.431 
He legally purchased guns in November 2010 and March 2011, under the guise of using 
them for hunting. He originally attempted to purchase the guns from criminal organizations 
before deciding it was much easier simply to purchase them in Norway legally. In 2010, 
he also purchased a Norwegian Police insignia from a print shop in Prague.432 In 2011, 
Breivik moved from his mother’s home to the farm that he had rented and began to build 
the bombs that he intended to use in the attack. His original strategy called for three 
different bombs, but he had trouble constructing these explosives, which resulted in a 
change of plan. He settled on one bomb and an attack on the island of Utøya because he 
knew that Labor Party leaders would be attending, and that the youth attending the camp 
would support the party’s multiculturalism platform.433 Breivik stated during his trial that 
his goal was to kill 600 people on the island. During this period, Breivik ordered explosive 
chemicals from Poland, which brought him to the attention of Norwegian authorities, who 
later determined that the purchase did not warrant further investigation and removed him 
from their watch list. 
From an investigative viewpoint, Breivik did not have a serious criminal history, 
as his only arrest was for graffiti at the age of 14. He did not express extremist viewpoints 
that would have brought him to their attention and did not “leak” information by telling 
people close to him of his intentions. While his actions raised concerns for his mental health 
among his mother and friends, it did not raise to the level that they involved mental health 
professionals. 
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Breivik’s case shows the difficulty and complexity for investigators faced with 
making critical conclusions about persons who have mental health issues. In this case, 
Breivik had two separate mental health evaluations following his arrest, which resulted in 
two differing results. The first evaluation determined that he had a psychotic disorder and 
the second that he had severe narcissistic personality disorder, a non-psychotic disorder. 
These evaluations, conducted by trained mental health professionals, illustrate how 
complicated it can be to determine a subject’s mental condition even by doctors trained to 
do so, much less by members of law enforcement.  
Breivik’s case highlights that for threat assessment investigators, in attempting to 
determine an individual’s mental state, the primary focus should be to identify whether or 
not that subject has the mental capability to plan, organize, and carry out an attack. In this 
case, no matter what his mental issues were, Breivik clearly demonstrated the ability not 
only to do all three, but the discipline to engage in operation security methods like 
withdrawing from those close to him, and not sharing any attack related information with 
them for at least five years while he planned the attack.  
Breivik was also able to anticipate the Norwegian Security Service’s reaction to his 
purchase of explosives and outsmart them by obtaining a farm. He correctly reasoned that 
they would assume it was for farm work, since he had no real criminal history, was not on 
any terrorist watch list, and was not known as an extremist in his online chats. In making 
this assumption, they made grave errors from which future threat assessment investigators 
should learn. Their first error was to make assumptions about the use of possible explosive 
materials without any verification or follow-up information, which would have been 
necessary to make an informed decision regarding Breivik’s potential as a threat.  
Following up on every lead can be very manpower intensive and will undoubtedly 
result in investigating many who are not threats, which is why cooperation needs to occur 
between all law enforcement agencies. It is unreasonable and irresponsible to rely solely 
on one agency to address such threats. The second lesson is not to base an assessment on 
only what has been done in the past. Norway had never experienced this type of attack 
prior to Breivik’s case, and assuming that someone is not smart enough to think of new 
ways to execute an attack and disguise their means is very dangerous. The studies reviewed 
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on lone actors show that many of them, like Breivik, do not have a violent history, so basing 
an assessment solely on past behaviors is a grave mistake.434 It is important to note that 
Breivik did not intend to get away with his crimes and stated that the arrest would be the 
beginning of the propaganda phase in which he would have attention and a large audience 
with which he could disseminate his message.435 
c. SNA Enhancement 
Question number 10 in this threat assessment, regarding “factors in the subject’s 
life and/or environment that might increase or decrease the likelihood that the subject will 
attempt an attack,” would be the element most closely tied to social network formulas.436 
Anders Breivik, similar to Timothy McVeigh, and the vast majority of subjects from the 
exceptional case study, exhibited change over time before finally reaching the planning 
and execution phase of his attack. Prior to 2006, he held anti-immigration views against 
Muslims shared by others in Norway and across Europe.437 
In Breivik’s case, once he began to withdraw in 2006, closing his business, 
withdrawing his membership in the Progressive Party, and moving in with his mother, his 
social network included fewer individuals who held differing views.438 As he continued to 
become more radicalized, his majority of his social ties was found on the internet and of a 
similar mindset regarding his political grievances.439 His failure to gain a position or 
acceptance in the group to which he likely held the strongest allegiance, the Progressive 
Party, should be strongly considered as a significant factor in setting him on a path to 
violence.440 
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d. Social Network Mapping of Anders Behring Breivik 
The following information is used for a SNA examination of Anders Breivik. The 
data for Breivik’s network was obtained from open source material, most notably the book 
One of Us.441 The data is separated into two time periods in Breivik’s life, and the SNA 
maps are created for both periods as an ego analysis, as well as an extended analysis to 
examine the ties held by his network. An additional ego SNA map was created from the 
post-radicalization period, which includes his internet connections, shown in Figure 7. The 
visualizations are a two-mode network, which maps both people and organizations. This 
project is limited because the subject of the examination is already known to have 
committed a violent act and is intended to provide a starting point for possible future 
research in the field of threat assessment. 
Using the information gathered on Breivik’s social ties allows a visual network of 
his life to be created. The network has been broken up into two different time periods. The 
first, described as pre-radicalization is from 1989, when he was in school, until 2006, which 
is denoted by the prosecutor in his case as the point at which he began to change, shown in 
Figure 5.442 The post-radicalization time period starts in 2006, and culminated on July 22, 
2011, with the completion of his attack, shown in Figure 6.443 
In Figure 7, Breivik’s online connections are included into a map of his ego 
network. The map with the inclusion of the internet network shows that Breivik had more 
ties online than in person. This added information would allow for an expanded amount of 
leads concerning people that an investigator would focus on during an investigation, and a 
better understanding of influencing ties. 
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Figure 5. Ego Network—Pre-Radicalization, 1/1/1989–1/1/2006 
(ORA v2.3.6) 
 




Figure 7. Ego Network (Including Internet)—Post-Radicalization, 
1/1/2006–7/22/201 (ORA v2.3.6) 
In examining the two social network maps of Breivik, it is clear that in the post-
radicalization period, he has a much smaller total network. It would be important to note 
that like McVeigh, during his post-radicalization period, he still had a social network and 
did not fall into a withdrawn “lone” category. However, he clearly did withdraw from 
groups like the Progressive Party that previously had been very important to him.444 His 
network was reduced to mostly his mother and some friends, as his sister had moved to the 
United States, and he did not see his father after 1984.445 The one group he did remain a 
part of was the St. Johns Lodge Freemasons, but he was not an active member and would 
leave this group in 2009 as well.446  
The further definition of Breivik’s network shown in Figures 8, 9 and 10 illuminates 
the extended network ties within the different groups that make up his associations. Using 
the mapping in conjunction with SIT, it can be seen that while the size of Breivik’s network 
certainly shrank, it may be the loss of one tie that affected him more than all the other ties 
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combined. His membership in the Progressive Party was clearly important to his identity 
and undoubtedly constrained his behavior and speech to conform to that group. His failure 
to gain a position could very well be the failure that started him on the path to violence. It 
is also important that when he cut ties by ending his party dues payments in 2006, he did 
not join another significant group.447 Breivik started the process of joining the Freemasons 
because of a relative who was a high-ranking member, but rarely attended meetings, and 
eventually discontinued his membership.448 Following his departure from the Progressive 
Party, his social influences were mainly in the form of online websites, which likely 
enhanced his ever-growing grievance.449 The results of SNA mapping on Breivik’s 
network show a person whose positive ties, or those acting as constraints against violence, 
are shrinking. Meanwhile, the number of negative ties in his network, especially those 
online leaning towards radicalization, are significantly increasing.  
                                               





Figure 8. Extended Network—Pre-Radicalization, 1/1/1989–
1/1/2006 (ORA v2.3.6) 
 
Figure 9. Extended Network—Post-Radicalization, 
1/1/2006–7/22/2011 (ORA v2.3.6) 
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Figure 10. Extended Network (Including Internet)—Post-
Radicalization, 1/1/2006–7/22/2011 (ORA v2.3.6) 
e. Operational Vulnerabilities 
One possible way to expand threat assessment is to identify where potential 
attackers are vulnerable in the planning and execution of their attack, and to learn from 
these potential vulnerabilities and develop strategies that address investigative 
opportunities. Breivik stated in court that he learned from the mistakes of a white 
supremacy group called eOrder, which had been successfully prosecuted in the 1980s, and 
from this prosecution, he decided that a one-man cell offered the best chance at success.450 
As targeted violence actors are learning from mistakes made by other attackers, it is vital 
that law enforcement learn from successful actors as well.  
Breivik was highly skilled in identifying and limiting his operational 
vulnerabilities. The few instances in which he was vulnerable include the 2002–2009 
period while he was writing his journal and describing his plans, the explosives chemical 
purchase, and in his online chats and research. Since he realized that he was vulnerable in 
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these aspects of his operation, he devised and implemented countermeasures to safeguard 
himself from each of these operational threats. He understood law enforcement techniques 
and terrorism laws enough to write, “any written plans combined with weapons or 
explosives are considered solid evidence.”451 He also understood the need to safeguard 
himself from computer evidence, writing that it was not enough to delete the information 
and wrote about methods that would prevent law enforcement from extracting this 
information.452 
The journal or compendium that he wrote, if discovered prior to its intended release 
on the day of the attack, would have been detrimental to his secret plan. Breivik was aware 
of this possibility and wrote: 
storing certain information electronically in shorter or longer periods is 
unavoidable during the research phase (logistical strategies and 
bomb/weapon schematics etc.). This information is usually stored on the 
individual’s PC while doing research. Keep in mind that the planning of 
military operations/attacks (under terrorism laws) is illegal. A schematic or 
vague indication of a plan are not considered solid evidence unless backed 
by either witness testimony or either weapons or explosive components 
together with verifiable affiliations to terror groups.453  
He further attempted to safeguard the journal by writing:  
the book should therefore never be considered anything else than fiction 
(not real). Please note that in order to do some of the research in this 
compendium the author had to visit/seek several controversial 
websites/sources in order to gain access to the information. This does not 
mean that the author or distributor have any sympathy or empathy for any 
specified or un-specified violent or non-violent groups. All “threats” etc in 
these fictional books are “in character” and its primary goal is to give an 
impression of what it would be like if we were under threat by an extremist 
[sic]organisation. It is therefore no need for concern by any 
police/state/government prosecutors or intelligence agencies about the 
content of this book due to its fictional nature.454 






Breivik was the most vulnerable in the purchase of the explosive chemicals used to 
make the vehicle bomb. While his ruse of obtaining a farm was successful in eluding 
Norwegian authorities, had they investigated the farm and found evidence that it was not 
actually being worked as a farm, or interviewed him about his knowledge of farming and 
his use of the explosive, it could have raised red flags. While sending an investigator to 
have a conversation with Breivik at his farm and verifying that it was in fact a working 
farm might have stopped the attack before it happened. It is also possible that an 
investigator may have been fooled due to Breivik’s extensive preparation to cover his true 
intentions.455 
Breivik shows his depth of understanding operational security in his manifesto, 
writing: 
as for creating an agriculture cover relating to the acquisition of substantial 
amounts of nitro-fertilizer; I originally had planned to create yet another 
agriculture prospectus and website etc., for use in the fertilizer-acquirement 
phase. However, I will instead just educate myself concerning a realistic 
case study involving growing sugarbeets on 5–20 acres (fertilizer intensive 
crop) in either my own country or my neighbouring country.456  
In doing so, not only did he give a valid reason for obtaining the explosives, but he also 
anticipated a possible interview and prepared to speak intelligently about the need for 
explosive materials and general knowledge about farming.457 
The final place in which he was potentially vulnerable was in his online discussions 
and searches. While Breivik made sure not to post anything in open chat forums that would 
have labeled him as an extremist, he might have been more open if he believed he was 
communicating directly with a like-minded person. He addressed this topic in his writing 
by stating the importance of using aliases when corresponding while doing research.458 He 
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further advised to use IP address masking software while researching via the internet, such 
as the Tor network.459 Regarding online security, he wrote:  
be extra careful when researching for bomb schematics ([sic]fertiliser 
bombs) as many terms will trigger electronic alerts. You can consider using 
other people’s networks remotely via laptop by parking outside their 
apartment/house. You can also buy an anonymous laptop and browse free 
from your local McDonalds etc. Use software to remove spy ware, cookies 
etc.460 
For law enforcement in this type of situation, having informants or undercover 
operatives with established online personas has the potential to uncover clues that can 
illuminate someone trying to operate in the shadows. However, Breivik was aware of how 
he was vulnerable in this realm and took very effective steps to negate his exposure. He 
even wrote about the people he needed to associate himself with to safeguard his mission, 
stating:  
The first of which is to surround yourself (either online or in real life) with 
people  who support your political ideology but who at the same time does 
not [sic]jeopardise your security in any way. You should therefore avoid 
any affiliations with known extremists or such groups as they are most 
likely flagged  (individuals and groups who are monitored by your national 
intelligence agency on so called “watch lists”). The reason why you should 
surround yourself with “moderate [sic]sympathisers” is because you will 
need a minimum of moral support.461 
Breivik understood his possible vulnerabilities and adapted his planning and 
implementation to neutralize almost every trace of his operation. The purchase of the 
explosive chemicals, which brought him to the attention of Norwegian authorities, was his 
most vulnerable aspect of the entire operation. The lesson for law enforcement is that the 
planning and methods employed by Breivik and anyone who uses his compendium as a 
guide will successfully hide them from scrutiny, but the weapons and explosive acquisition 
are concrete activities that can be monitored and tracked. The best outcome in this case 
would have been to interview Breivik after the purchase of the chemicals to allow an 





investigator to judge his responses for validity, and potentially lead an investigator to 
determine that he was a threat.  
For law enforcement, this case shows the difficulty in illuminating someone as 
calculating as Breivik and intervening before he is able to commit his violent attack 
successfully. This case also suggests that the best course of action is to concentrate 
intelligence investigations on concrete actions like the purchase and thefts of explosives 
and weapons.  
B. CASE STUDIES CONCLUSION 
An analysis of these two cases reveals striking similarities between the backgrounds 
of McVeigh and Breivik. During their childhood development, both individuals lived in 
homes with troubled marriages, which eventually led to one parent leaving the family. 
McVeigh’s mother left home when he was 10 years old and Breivik’s parents separated 
before he was two years old.462 Breivik had minimal contact with his father and would last 
see him at the age of 15.463 Neither subject did well in school, nor did they have any real 
success in any aspect of their lives during this period. Neither subject had any significant 
criminal activity prior to the planning and implementing of their attacks. Both subjects did 
have some success after leaving school. McVeigh was a decorated soldier in the U.S. 
Army, who was promoted to the position of Sergeant, and Breivik operated a business that 
sold fake diplomas, which was financially successful for a period before eventually going 
bankrupt.464  
Both subjects suffered failures with the most significant groups in their lives, 
McVeigh when he failed Army Special Forces Selection School and Breivik when he failed 
to obtain a position with the Progressive Party.465 After these failures, while both saw a 
significant decrease in their social networks, they were not isolated and still maintained a 
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social network. However, both of their network ties from that point were heavily weighted 
towards those who shared the same extremist views, and neither was a member of a group 
that would have constrained their violent behavior. Both subjects were motivated by long-
standing grievances against the government that evolved over an extended period of time. 
Many of the contacts that both had after leaving the groups that were important to their 
identities would have pushed them on a continued path of violence rather that constraining 
violent ideas.  
Both subjects gravitated to others who shared similar extremist views, but 
eventually determined that they were the one who needed to lead the way with actions 
because the others were incapable.466 They were similar in their grandiose ideas of self-
importance, which did not coincide with the lens of failure through which the rest of society 
viewed them.467 Both spent considerable time planning and coordinating their attacks, and 
both used extensive operational security methods to conceal acquiring the explosives 
needed for their attacks. Both subjects used similar bombing attacks, although Breivik was 
clearly influenced by McVeigh’s attack, and expanded his own attack in a much more 
personal way than McVeigh. In this regard, he was likely attempting to eclipse McVeigh 
for the shocking nature of the attack, and thereby bring more attention to himself.468  
In a comparison of mental health issues, the subjects have some notable differences, 
but their similarities are likely more significant. McVeigh had some suicidal thoughts prior 
to his attack, but was not diagnosed with a mental health issue.469 Breivik, on the other 
hand, did not have suicidal thoughts, and was evaluated twice following his attack. In the 
first evaluation, they found that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that made him 
criminally innocent, but in the second opinion, which the court sided with, Breivik was 
found to have pathological self-aggrandizement, and was found criminally responsible.470 
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Whatever their medical diagnoses, both men had the capacity to plan, organize, and carry 
out an attack, and neither was hindered in that regard by any mental incapacity. If anything, 
possible feelings of paranoia may have caused them to add layers of operational security 
into their plans, which thereby made them harder to detect.  
The subjects differed in the fact that McVeigh leaked information to others prior to 
committing the attack and Breivik did not.471 McVeigh also enlisted the help of the people 
he had leaked the information to in assembling the truck bomb, whereas Breivik made his 
preparations and assembly alone. Both subjects did extensive amounts of research, and 
both visited the eventual location prior to the attack.472 
Both subjects struggled with employment related issues, and both likely felt a loss 
of status before radicalization. Neither subject suffered a significant personal loss prior to 
radicalization; however, McVeigh lost his grandfather in the year prior to his attack, whom 
he described as the only person he ever loved, which may have removed any final possible 
restraint for the attack.473 Breivik did not have anyone in his life whom he cared about 
enough to act as a restraint; he was closest to his mother but had a complicated relationship 
with her. Neither subject dated very much, nor had any significantly important romantic 
relationship, which has been linked to long-term feelings of inadequacy.474 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Specialized units need to be created within law enforcement that better understand 
threat assessment investigations, and gain experience conducting them. Threat assessment 
investigations are more closely tied to intelligence gathering investigations than to normal 
investigations, with an end result of formal criminal charges. In addition to utilizing normal 
investigative techniques, a threat assessment investigator needs to understand both mental 
health issues and grievances in people who may be attempting to hide their true intentions. 
Threat assessment investigations involve gaining as much information possible about a 
person to determine if this person will at some point, maybe years down the line, commit 
an act of violence. In addition to the threat assessment model provided by the assassination 
case study, additions should include the added help of metal health providers working in 
conjunction with investigators, as well as computerized mapping of the subject’s social 
networks.  
A. ANALYSIS 
The United Kingdom model for combining mental health professionals and law 
enforcement shows great promise in attempting to understand all aspects of a subject fully 
who is under assessment. This model should be studied for use in this country. Threat 
assessment groups should include representatives from all relevant law enforcement 
agencies sharing information. The more information gathered results in a clearer picture, 
which will result in a better understanding and analysis. These threat assessment groups 
should investigate all types of targeted violence including lone wolves and school shooters. 
For school threat assessment subjects, officials in the educational system should be 
included and consulted by the assessment groups. Computer case models, which alert the 
investigator if the subject under threat assessment does something that requires immediate 
attention, such as the purchase of a gun or explosives, should also be utilized. This SNA 
would have the benefit of providing an investigator with the best contacts to interview to 
gain insight into the subject’s mental state and possible motivations and grievances. 
Understanding the people closest to the subject is also important because one of the 
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statistics found across various studies shows that a high percentage of targeted violence 
offenders communicate their intentions to commit violence to people close to them. An 
SNA can also provide investigators with a picture to identify changes over time, which is 
important since many targeted violence actors take years from the time they develop the 
grievance until they move to an actual pathway of violence. 
The FBI may be overtasked and not able to handle this problem by itself, as the 
results of Stoneman Douglas, the Boston marathon bombing, and the Pulse nightclub, have 
highlighted. Approximately 14,000 FBI agents are tasked with multiple assignments, as 
are more than 750,000 local and state law enforcement officers.475 These local departments 
have an equal stake in protecting their citizens, and frequently, with a better understanding 
of local intelligence. The best solution to this very complex problem is to utilize all the 
available assets.  
SNA has the potential for great success within the field of threat assessment. As the 
case studies in this research show, the SNA model provides an investigator with a simple 
visual map of the important people and groups within a subject’s network. These important 
ties are vital to understanding those who influence and constrain the subject’s actions. At 
the core of any inquiry, the more information that the investigators have, the more accurate 
they will be with the direction of the investigation itself. This mapping converts raw 
information into a digestible and more easily understandable format. This tool not only 
shows the size of the subjects’ network, it can also be used as snapshots of time to show if 
subjects are withdrawing from their networks. SNA should be used in conjunction with 
SIT to understand how the network data collected by SNA will act as a pathway or 
constraint on the subject of the analysis.  
As a tool, SNA would also make the transfer of cases potentially easier. As 
mentioned, many subjects have taken years to move from their original grievance to their 
pathway to violence, during which time it is possible that the original investigator would 
                                               
475 “Fiscal Year 2017 Budget,” Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 
October 10, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/822286/download; Duren Banks et al., National 
Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2016), 2, 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf. 
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no longer be assigned to the case. A social network map from the original investigation 
would be extremely helpful in identifying the current influential people in the subjects’ 
lives, and determining if the network is becoming more conducive to radicalization. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is the recommendation of this thesis that continued research be done to explore 
the creation of threat assessment groups similar to the United Kingdom model to combat 
the growing problem of homegrown radicalized terrorism, lone wolf attackers, and school 
shooters. These groups should be made up of medical health professionals, educators, and 
members of law enforcement. The law enforcement members should be a combination of 
local, state, and federal.  
The model should provide training for all members of the team in threat assessment 
and threat management. Funding should be provided to this group to support prevention 
programs modeled on the United Kingdom Channel program to address de-radicalization 
and community support. When those with mental illnesses come to the attention of the 
threat assessment group, if they are deemed not to be a threat, they should be assisted in 
finding help within the mental health system. The program should focus on continued 
periodic monitoring of anyone deemed a threat to such time as the decision is made that 
they no longer pose a threat.  
The focus of the group mission should prioritize prevention over successful 
prosecution after an attack. Due to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA) laws protecting the medical records of subjects of the threat assessment group, 
the path should follow one of two tracks. First, the medical professionals should review the 
records. Following this review, the medical staff should share the information based on 45 
CFR 164.512(j)(1)(i); which allows information to be shared with a law enforcement 
official who is “reasonably able to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the 
health or safety of an individual or the public.”476 If the threat from the subject is not 
                                               
476 “Uses and Disclosures for Which an Authorization or Opportunity to Agree or Object Is Not 
Required,” Department of Health and Human Services, Code of Federal Regulations, title 45 (2004 comp.): 
164.512, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2004-title45-vol1/CFR-2004-title45-vol1-sec164-512. 
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imminent but the medical professionals feel that the information needs to be shared with 
the law enforcement members, then a court order permitting the records to be reviewed 
should be obtained based on public safety. It is important that the model include the 
methods in which different groups share information, both intelligence on subjects who 
pose threats, as well as methods, practices, and strategies. Ideally, these threat assessment 
groups should include a representative from every law enforcement agency that conducts 
any type of threat assessment, such as the FBI and United States Secret Service, to share 
information and reduce the amount of duplicated effort. 
It is also recommended that further research be done in the use of SNA and SIT to 
inform threat assessment investigations better. The ultimate goal of the research is to ensure 
that future threat subjects have an SNA included as part of their threat assessments. Threat 
assessment investigators should be educated in SIT to assist in understanding the SNA 
results. A case management system should incorporate the SNA information, and include 
computer-monitoring files that will notify the investigator when certain triggers occur, such 
as the subject purchasing a gun or explosives, being arrested, or having someone close to 
the subject experience one of the triggers. These triggers should act as an immediate flag 
that initiates an investigative response to check on the mental or situational status of the 
subject and determine if the subject should be reclassified as a threat requiring more 
monitoring and further investigation. It is also recommended that social network postings 
for the subject be monitored to assess if the subject may be moving towards a path of 
violence and need further contact and or a follow-up investigation. 
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APPENDIX. SNA SUB GROUPS 
The following subgroups are taken directly from Understanding Dark Networks, 
Appendix 2.477 
 Clique: A clique is maximal complete subnetwork containing three or more 
 actors. The term “maximal” means that no other actor can be added to the clique 
 without destroying its defining characteristic, which in this case means that each 
 actor must be tied to each other actor. 
 Community Detection: Community detection algorithms are a series of 
 clustering algorithms that detect subgroups such that there are more ties within the 
 subgroups than across them than one would expect in a random graph of the same 
 size with the same number of ties. The optimal number of subgroups generally 
 uses modularity as a measure of fit. 
 Faction: A faction is a subnetwork where each actor is tied to all other actors 
 within their own subnetwork but have no ties to actors in other subnetworks. 
 K-Core: Formally, a k-core is a maximal group of actors, all of who are 
 connected to some number (k) of other group members. 
 Strong Component: In a strong component, each pair of actors is connected by a 
 (directed) path and no other actor can be added without destroying its 
 connectedness. 
 Weak Component: In a weak component, each pair of actors is connected by an 
 undirected path (i.e., a semi-path) and no other actor can be added without 
 destroying its connectedness. 
  
                                               
477 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, 323–331. 
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